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THE NEW SEX DISCRIMINATION  
ZACHARY A. KRAMER† 
ABSTRACT 
  Sex discrimination law has not kept pace with the lived experience 
of discrimination. In the early years of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, courts settled on an idea of what sex discrimination looks 
like—formal practices that exclude employees based on their group 
membership. The problem is that sex discrimination has become 
highly individualized. Modern sex discrimination does not target all 
men or all women, nor does it target subgroups of men or women. 
The victims of modern sex discrimination are particular men and 
women who face discrimination because they do not or cannot 
conform to the norms of the workplace. These employees have been 
shut out of a sex discrimination regime that still expects employees to 
anchor their claims to a narrative of group subordination. 
  I argue that the lived experience of discrimination should 
determine employment discrimination doctrine and not the other way 
around. Accordingly, I propose a new regime for sex discrimination 
law. The model for the new sex discrimination regime is religious 
discrimination law. Unlike other areas of employment discrimination 
law, religious discrimination law offers a dynamic conception of 
identity and a greater array of different theories of discrimination. I 
argue that sex discrimination law can and should work this way, too. 
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  On a broader level, the paper makes a strong normative claim 
about the substance of Title VII’s sex equality project. I argue that sex 
discrimination law needs to recalibrate its vision of equality. 
Difference is universal. No two women (or men) are the same, and 
this is a good thing. Thus the central task of sex discrimination law 
should be to better recognize—and, in turn, protect—the distinctive 
ways in which employees express their maleness and femaleness. It is 
these differences, after all, that shape the way employees experience 
modern sex discrimination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, Darlene Jespersen lost a job that she loved.1 For over 
twenty years, Jespersen worked as a bartender at Harrah’s Casino in 
Reno, Nevada.2 During her career at Harrah’s, she accumulated a 
strong work record, earning the praise of coworkers and customers 
alike.3 Things went downhill for Jespersen, however, when Harrah’s 
adopted a new appearance code for its beverage service personnel.4 
The new policy—which Harrah’s called the “Personal Best” 
program—required female employees to, among other things, wear 
makeup during their shifts.5 The makeup requirement posed a 
problem for Jespersen, as she never wore makeup on or off the job.6 
Jespersen explained that wearing makeup made her feel “ill,” 
“degraded,” “exposed,” and “violated.”7 She felt that makeup robbed 
her of her “credibility as an individual and as a person,” so much so 
that she could not do her job well if forced to wear makeup during 
her shifts.8 
Despite her many years of service and her exemplary record, 
Harrah’s would not budge on the makeup requirement, and Jespersen 
soon found herself out of a job.9 She responded by bringing a sex 
discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VII),10 alleging that Harrah’s “Personal Best” program—
specifically the makeup requirement—amounted to unlawful sex 
discrimination.11 Jespersen’s theory of discrimination was that the 
makeup requirement compelled female employees to conform to a 
 
 1. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 2. Id. at 1106–07. 
 3. See id. at 1106–08 (describing Jespersen’s work as “exemplary” and noting her 
favorable customer reviews and employer evaluations). 
 4. Id. at 1107. 
 5. Id. The “Personal Best” program was part of Harrah’s “Beverage Department Image 
Transformation” program. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1107–08. 
 7. Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief at 34 n.8, Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104 (No. 03-
15045), 2003 WL 25859577. For a useful and comprehensive discussion of Jespersen’s case, see 
generally Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup 
and Women at Work, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 
2006).  
 8. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108. 
 9. Id. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).  
 11. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108. 
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stereotypical standard of femininity,12 a variation on the gender-
stereotyping theory developed by the Supreme Court in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.13 The thrust of the gender-stereotyping 
theory is, in the words of the Court, that an employer cannot 
“evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group.”14 
In the end, Jespersen could not sustain her stereotyping claim 
against Harrah’s. The Ninth Circuit concluded that her injuries were 
too subjective to support her gender-stereotyping claim. According to 
the court, “The record contains nothing to suggest the grooming 
standards would objectively inhibit a woman’s ability to do the job.”15 
The court made clear that, as a general matter, an employee can 
challenge a grooming code on gender-stereotyping grounds16 but that 
the “subjective reaction of a single employee” is not sufficient to 
support such a claim.17 
There is a coming crisis in sex discrimination law, and employees 
like Darlene Jespersen are at the center of it.18 Sex discrimination law 
has not kept pace with the lived experience of sex discrimination. 
When Title VII became law, most instances of sex discrimination 
involved overt discrimination that differentiated between men and 
women, almost always to the detriment of female employees.19 And it 
was not uncommon for employers to justify a discriminatory practice 
by appealing to perceived or stereotypical differences between men 
and women. Consider a prominent example. The Water and Power 
Department for the City of Los Angeles administered a retirement 
benefits system for its employees, which it funded, in part, through 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. 
 14. Id. at 251 (plurality opinion). 
 15. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. 
 16. See id. at 1113 (“We emphasize that we do not preclude, as a matter of law, a claim of 
sex-stereotyping on the basis of dress or appearance codes. Others may well be filed, and any 
bases for such claims refined as law in this area evolves.”). 
 17. Id.  
 18. I have borrowed the phrase “coming crisis” from an influential article by Professor Ken 
Karst. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 523 (1997).  
 19. See Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 644–46 
(2005); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60, 465–68 (2001); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as 
Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 167–70, 172–75 
(2004). 
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employee contributions.20 The Department required female 
employees to contribute greater monthly payments to its pension 
fund than male employees, which meant that female employees took 
home less pay than their male coworkers.21 The Department’s reason 
for making women contribute more than men was that, on average, 
women tend to live longer than men.22 The discrimination was formal 
in nature, targeting women as a group. 
The problem is that sex discrimination looks very different 
today. Sex discrimination has become highly individualized. Modern 
sex discrimination does not target all men or all women, nor does it 
target subgroups of men or women—such as women who are 
aggressive and men who are effeminate.23 The victims of modern sex 
discrimination are particular men and women who face discrimination 
because they do not or cannot conform to the norms of the 
workplace.24 In addition to Darlene Jespersen, it is the male truck 
driver who wears women’s clothing;25 it is the bus driver who cannot 
find a bathroom to use while she is transitioning from male to 
female;26 it is the effeminate man who sticks out like a sore thumb in a 
rural Wisconsin factory;27 it is the new mother who needs extra breaks 
during the workday to pump milk for her newborn baby;28 it is the 
hairstylist who is fired from her salon because she is a butch lesbian;29 
and it is the overweight telemarketer who is told she is not pretty 
enough for a face-to-face sales position.30 Time and time again, these 
employees, often the most marginalized employees in their respective 
workplaces, have struggled to find their footing in a sex 
 
 20. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704–05 (1978). 
 21. Id. at 705. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Cf. Yuracko, supra note 19, at 175–77 (describing subgroup discrimination in terms of 
trait discrimination).  
 24. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, 
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2548–49 (1994); Devon W. 
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2000); Gowri 
Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither 
Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 299–300 (2005); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 
YALE L.J. 769, 811–13 (2002). 
 25. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 16, 2002). 
 26. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 27. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1058–60 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 28. Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 29. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 30. Marks v. Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 72 F. Supp. 2d 322, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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discrimination regime that still views the group as the focal point of 
discrimination. 
This Article initiates a conversation about the future of sex 
discrimination. It lays the foundation for a new sex discrimination 
regime that is tailored to the lived experience of sex discrimination as 
it exists today rather than as it once did. The driving force behind my 
argument is the idea that, when it comes to developing 
antidiscrimination protections, the lived experience of discrimination 
should determine the doctrine and not the other way around.31 I 
believe that this is what Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. had in mind when 
he wrote, in The Common Law, that “[t]he life of the law has not 
been logic; it has been experience.”32 The toughest obstacle facing 
victims of modern sex discrimination is the need to anchor their 
discrimination claims to a narrative of group subordination—to show, 
in other words, that the discrimination they faced in the workplace 
harms their group as a whole. My goal is to imagine a sex 
discrimination regime that is not tethered to group subordination. 
Sex discrimination law needs to move in a new direction. And 
religious discrimination law provides a template for how to do that. 
Religious discrimination occupies a special place within Title VII 
thanks to two interrelated doctrinal features. The first is a dynamic 
conception of what constitutes a religion. Like other areas of Title 
VII, religious discrimination protects employees against status 
discrimination33—for instance, an employee being fired for being 
Jewish.34 But what separates religious discrimination from the rest of 
Title VII is that it also protects employees against religious-practice 
discrimination35—for instance, an employee being fired for refusing to 
 
 31. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 176 
(2006) (“[D]octrinal formulations are less important to the law’s development than the cultural 
experience in which those laws are embedded.”). 
 32. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881). 
 33. The status protection for religion flows from Title VII’s general nondiscrimination 
command. Title VII provides: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 34. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 787 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 35. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII by adding a broader definition of “religion,” 
which “includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). 
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work on the Sabbath.36 What is more, religious discrimination law 
embraces an attitude of liberal neutrality toward the particulars of a 
person’s religion.37 For a belief or practice to count as a religion, all an 
employee needs to show is that it is religious within her own scheme 
of things and that it is sincerely held. The result is a body of law that 
recognizes a vast universe of religious practices, each as distinctive as 
the next.38 
The second doctrinal feature of religious discrimination law 
flows immediately from the dynamic conception of religion as a 
protected trait. In addition to the standard prohibition against 
disparate treatment,39 religious discrimination law also imposes on 
employers a duty to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious 
practice.40 As a theory of discrimination, reasonable accommodation 
goes further than the standard disparate treatment protection, which 
 
 36. See, e.g., Reed v. Mineta, 93 F. App’x 195, 196 (10th Cir. 2004) (involving an air traffic 
controller who was fired because he refused to work on the Sabbath holiday). 
 37. Of course, Title VII takes a hands-off approach so as not to offend the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment, which allows individuals to worship as they choose free from 
government interference. 
 38. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 128, 131 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(involving a store cashier who, as a member of the Church of Body Modification, challenged the 
employer’s “no facial jewelry” policy); Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 
473 (7th Cir. 2001) (involving an employee who, as an expression of her faith, told people to 
“Have a Blessed Day” when ending a conversation or written communication); Altman v. Minn. 
Dep’t of Corr., 251 F.3d 1199, 1199 (8th Cir. 2001) (involving prison employees who were 
reprimanded for reading bibles during a mandatory training on lesbian and gay employees in 
the workplace); Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 772 (7th Cir. 1998) (involving a 
police officer whose religious beliefs prevented him from guarding an abortion clinic); Peterson 
v. Minidoka, 118 F.3d 1351, 1356–58 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving a public school principal who was 
demoted after deciding to homeschool his children so they could receive an education in which 
all of their classes would reflect “an aspect of God being the creator”); EEOC v. United Parcel 
Serv., 94 F.3d 314, 315–16 (7th Cir. 1996) (involving an employee who wore a beard for religious 
purposes); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (involving an employee 
who was fired for missing work to attend his wife’s conversion ceremony); Chenzira v. 
Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL 6721098, at *1, *4 (S.D. 
Ohio Dec. 27, 2012) (involving an employee who refused to get a flu shot, as required by the 
employer’s policy, because the employee was vegan).  
 39. See, e.g., Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving a 
police officer who alleged that he was discriminated against because he was Jewish); Campos v. 
City of Blue Springs, 289 F.3d 546, 549–50 (8th Cir. 2002) (involving a plaintiff who practiced 
Native American spirituality and who alleged that he was fired because he was not Christian); 
EEOC v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 276 F.3d 326, 328 (7th Cir. 2002) (involving an Evangelical 
Christian Baptist hospital recruiter who alleged that she was repeatedly told to soften her 
religious expression).  
 40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Religious discrimination law’s reasonable accommodation 
framework grows out of the Supreme Court’s decision in the now-famous Hardison case. See 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75–76 (1977). 
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only restricts employers from introducing bias into the workplace. 
Reasonable accommodation, by contrast, requires employers to 
redesign the workplace to account for the needs of their employees, 
provided that doing so will not create an “undue hardship” for the 
employer.41 From an organizational perspective, the advantage of an 
accommodation framework is that it should promote collaboration 
between employers and employees, the hope being that when an 
employee’s religious practice conflicts with an employer’s policy, the 
employee will negotiate rather than litigate to find a solution to the 
problem. 
Taken together, these doctrinal features create a legal 
environment that caters to individuals rather than groups. Sex 
discrimination law can—and I argue that it should—work this way, 
too. My proposal is that the new sex discrimination law should track 
the doctrinal structures of religious discrimination law. First, sex 
discrimination law should adopt a more dynamic conception of sex as 
a protected trait, one that affirmatively protects sex as both a status 
and a practice. Of all the proposed reforms in this Article, this one 
should be the easiest to implement, as the gender-stereotyping theory 
of sex discrimination has laid the groundwork for just such a robust 
protection. On top of that, discrimination claimants should have 
greater freedom to define the nature of their sex practice, just as 
claimants in religious discrimination cases do. 
The second major doctrinal change is that sex discrimination law 
should supplement disparate treatment analysis with a reasonable 
accommodation protection. This is admittedly a more controversial 
proposal, though it nevertheless dovetails nicely with a more dynamic 
conception of sex as a protected trait. In making this proposal, I am 
mindful of Professor Kenji Yoshino’s warning that we should not 
think of reasonable accommodation as legal penicillin.42 Reasonable 
accommodation is not a panacea, and I do not think it will cure all the 
ills of sex discrimination. But I do think that reasonable 
accommodation offers a better way for the law to contend with the 
harms of modern sex discrimination than does the legal landscape 
currently available to a discrimination claimant. The defining 
characteristic of modern sex discrimination is that it is experienced 
individually, and reasonable accommodation is an individualized 
theory of discrimination. As we look to the future of sex 
 
 41. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. 
 42. YOSHINO, supra note 31, at 167–68, 174–75. 
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discrimination law, we need a framework that treats discrimination 
claimants as individuals, not as members of a group. Reasonable 
accommodation provides this framework. 
For these doctrinal changes to take hold, we will also need to 
recalibrate the vision of equality that undergirds sex discrimination 
law. For most of its history, sex discrimination law has conceived of 
equality in terms of treating men and women, as groups, in the same 
way.43 According to this view, equality is cast in neutral terms, 
providing formal protections for the sexes as compared against each 
other. But the new sex discrimination demands a vision of equality 
that is rooted in difference rather than sameness, a vision of equality 
that understands that no two women (and no two men) are the same. 
Going forward, the central task of sex discrimination law should be to 
better recognize—and, in turn, protect—the distinctive ways in which 
employees express their maleness and femaleness. It is these 
differences, after all, that shape the way employees experience 
modern sex discrimination. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. The purpose of Part I is to 
put my argument in context. To that end, it outlines the three main 
theories of discrimination currently available in employment 
discrimination law and contrasts two competing visions of equality. 
From there, Part II tells the story of why employees like Darlene 
Jespersen have such a hard time raising actionable sex discrimination 
claims. More specifically, this Part develops a wide-ranging critique of 
existing sex discrimination law, challenging the doctrinal rules, 
historical fictions, and normative values that anchor the law to 
narratives of group subordination. As a part of that discussion, I also 
propose a new normative baseline for Title VII’s sex equality 
project.44 The thrust of this claim is that Title VII should not define 
sex equality in terms of what is good for all or even most women (or 
men), but rather in terms of what individual men and women need to 
flourish in the workplace. 
Part III sketches a new framework for sex discrimination law. 
Modeled on the protections currently available to employees in 
religious discrimination cases, this new framework relaxes sex 
 
 43. See Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1313 (2012). 
 44. “Title VII’s sex equality project” is my own term. It is meant to convey that, because 
equality is not a self-defining concept, the principal work of a statute like Title VII is to develop 
some vision of what equality looks like. This Article contributes to this project—the project of 
imagining equality—by proposing a new idea of what it means to treat the sexes equally.  
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discrimination law’s conception of identity, making the law more 
responsive to the needs of employees as individuals. It also adds 
reasonable accommodation as a formal response to sex 
discrimination, which will force employers and employees to shoulder 
the burden, together, to accommodate differences in the workplace. 
Taken together, these doctrinal reforms will bring discrimination law 
more in line with the lived experience of discrimination as it exists 
today. Reimagining sex discrimination law in this way will also 
require that we rethink what equality means. Part III also argues that 
sex discrimination law needs to embrace a more holistic vision of 
equality, one that is sensitive to difference as well as sameness. 
Stepping back, Part IV considers the broader implications of my 
argument. The goal of this discussion is to jumpstart a conversation 
about the future of employment discrimination. Accordingly, Part IV 
raises some hard questions about where employment discrimination 
law has been, where it is now, and where it needs to go in the future. 
I.  CONTEXT 
Before turning to the substance of my argument, this Part offers 
a brief tour of the doctrinal landscape of employment discrimination 
law. This discussion highlights two fundamental features of the law. 
First, it outlines the three main theories of discrimination that 
currently exist in employment discrimination law—disparate 
treatment, disparate impact, and reasonable accommodation. Such a 
discussion is helpful because my proposal, developed in detail below, 
is that sex discrimination law should shift from one theory of 
discrimination (disparate treatment) to another (reasonable 
accommodation). Second, it distinguishes between two competing 
visions of equality that undergird employment discrimination law. In 
terms of scope, the following discussion is purely descriptive. My goal 
in the immediate Section is to provide a doctrinal foundation for my 
normative claims about the past, present, and future of sex 
discrimination law. 
A. Theories of Discrimination 
As a body of law, employment discrimination is concerned with 
the “rights and responsibilities of employers and employees.”45 In 
 
 45. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION xxvii (7th ed. 2008). 
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particular, employment discrimination law seeks to regulate a small 
slice of employment decisions. Discrimination, in the broadest sense 
of the term, is essential to the organization of a workplace. Employers 
discriminate all the time—they make decisions about whom to hire 
and fire, whom to assign to certain shifts and special projects, and 
whom to promote and transfer. Employment discrimination law only 
comes into play when one of these employment decisions implicates a 
trait that is protected by statute.46 The primary task of employment 
discrimination law, then, is to determine if an employment decision is 
based on one of these prohibited traits.47 
To facilitate this inquiry, employment discrimination law 
distinguishes between three theories of discrimination—disparate 
treatment, disparate impact, and reasonable accommodation. These 
theories are mutually exclusive, with each responding to a distinct 
experience of discrimination. Disparate treatment governs a situation 
in which an employer treats employees differently on account of a 
protected trait. Disparate impact addresses cases of unintentional 
discrimination, in which a nondiscriminatory rule has a discriminatory 
effect. And reasonable accommodation covers instances in which an 
employer fails to account for an employee’s special needs. I consider 
these theories in turn. 
1. Disparate Treatment.  Disparate treatment is the analytical 
backbone of employment discrimination law. The theory rests on a 
principle—often referred to as an anticlassification principle—that an 
employer cannot make employment decisions that classify an 
employee (or a group of employees) on the basis of a protected trait, 
such as race, sex, or religion.48 The critical feature of disparate 
 
 46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (proscribing discrimination on the basis of “race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
 47. This is employment discrimination law’s discriminatory-causation requirement. To 
state an actionable discrimination claim, a claimant must show that the alleged discrimination 
was “because of” a protected trait and not “because of” a trait that is not protected by Title VII. 
In a prominent age discrimination case, the Supreme Court described discriminatory causation 
as a situation in which “liability depends on whether the protected trait . . . actually motivated 
the employer’s decision.” Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). The Court 
continued, “Whatever the employer’s decisionmaking process, a disparate treatment claim 
cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and 
had a determinative influence on the outcome.” Id. 
 48. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (“Roughly speaking, 
this principle holds that the government may not classify people either overtly or surreptitiously 
on the basis of a forbidden category: for example, their race.”). The principle was first identified 
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treatment analysis is the causation requirement, which flows from the 
statutory command that prohibits discrimination “because of” a 
protected trait.49 Consider an example. Say that two current 
employees—a man and a woman—apply for a promotion to be the 
new director of sales, and the employer promotes the male employee. 
To state a disparate treatment claim, the female employee must show 
that she was denied the promotion for an illegitimate reason—
because she is a woman—and not for some legitimate reason, such as 
an inferior sales record or a spotty attendance record. 
The specifics of how a discrimination claimant proves a disparate 
treatment claim—what kind of evidence is needed to support a claim 
and what evidentiary framework a fact finder will use to assess the 
claim—are beyond the scope of the immediate discussion.50 But it is 
important to note that the touchstone of disparate treatment is 
discriminatory intent or motive.51 In the previous example, the 
employer’s decision created a discriminatory result because a man 
was promoted over a woman. For the female employee to state a 
disparate treatment claim, however, she must show that the 
discriminatory result was motivated by a discriminatory purpose—for 
instance, that the employer thought women were not cut out for 
managerial positions.52 
 
by Professor Owen Fiss in a classic article. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157–64 (1976). 
 49. See supra note 47.  
 50. For further discussion of specifics in the context of sex discrimination claims, see 
generally Jessica Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525 (2013). 
 51. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (“‘Disparate 
treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats 
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical . . . . Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the 
most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.”); see also Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (“A disparate treatment plaintiff must establish ‘that the 
defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive’ for taking a job-related action.” (quoting 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988))); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) (“The ultimate question in every employment 
discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the 
victim of intentional discrimination.”); Watson, 487 U.S. at 986 (“In such ‘disparate treatment’ 
cases . . . the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or 
motive.”). 
 52. See generally Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial 
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest 
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (critiquing the “lack of interest” defense to sex 
discrimination). 
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Under a disparate treatment rule, an employer cannot inject bias 
into the workplace.53 This is what separates disparate treatment from 
reasonable accommodation. In the latter case, discrimination is 
defined in terms of whether the employer has adequately adjusted the 
job to satisfy the needs of individual employees. By contrast, 
disparate treatment does not question the way an employer organizes 
its workplace. In the words of Professors Pam Karlan and George 
Rutherglen, disparate treatment “essentially takes jobs as it finds 
them.”54 
2. Disparate Impact.  If discriminatory intent is the touchstone of 
disparate treatment, then discriminatory effect is the touchstone of 
disparate impact. Disparate impact captures unintentional 
discrimination, cases in which an employment policy is fair on its face 
but harms one group of employees more than another.55 The least 
intuitive of the three theories of discrimination, disparate impact is 
best explained in the context of an example. 
Alabama had a statute that set a minimum height and weight 
requirement to work in a correctional facility (five feet two, 120 
pounds).56 The female plaintiff applied for a position as a correctional 
counselor but was rejected because she fell short of the statute’s 
weight requirement.57 She challenged the policy under a disparate 
impact theory. At the time of the suit, women fourteen years of age 
or older made up 52.7 percent of the Alabama population but held 
only 12.9 percent of the correctional counselor positions.58 Taken 
together, the height and weight requirements created a disparate 
impact: the rule excluded from consideration 41.1 percent of women 
and less than 1 percent of men.59 Importantly, the plaintiff’s claim did 
not allege purposeful sex segregation. Even though Alabama adopted 
 
 53. Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the 
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2009). 
 54. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and 
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1996). Professors Karlan and Rutherglen go on 
to explain that Title VII “defines discrimination in a negative sense: employment practices are 
unlawful only if they prevent individuals from doing the job as the employer defines it.” Id. 
 55. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15 (“[Disparate impact claims] involve employment 
practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more 
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.”). 
 56. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323–24 (1977). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 329. 
 59. Id. at 329–30. 
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the height and weight requirements because it was concerned for the 
safety of its correctional officers, the rule still violated Title VII.60 
The full story of disparate impact is worthy of serious 
consideration as we think about the future of employment 
discrimination law. It is not, however, integral to my goal in this 
Article. For this reason, the remainder of this Article is focused on 
disparate treatment and the third main theory of discrimination, 
reasonable accommodation. 
3. Reasonable Accommodation.  The newest of the three theories 
of discrimination, reasonable accommodation, emerged on the scene 
as part of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,61 the statutory precursor to 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).62 Today, reasonable 
accommodation is a part of only a small handful of antidiscrimination 
statutes,63 most notably the ADA and Title VII’s religious 
discrimination provision.64 
The basic thrust of reasonable accommodation is that the 
employer must take steps to modify a job to fit the needs of a 
particular employee.65 Take an example from Title VII’s religious 
 
 60. Id. at 332. The Court characterized the plaintiff’s claim as follows: 
The gist of the claim that the statutory height and weight requirements discriminate 
against women does not involve an assertion of purposeful discriminatory motive. It 
is asserted, rather, that these facially neutral qualification standards work in fact 
disproportionately to exclude women from eligibility for employment by the 
Alabama Board of Corrections.  
Id. at 328–29 (footnote omitted). 
 61. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 62. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 63. Two other statutes that provide for reasonable-accommodation claims are worth 
mentioning. The first is the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
(USERRA), which protects military veterans against discrimination. See Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335 (2006). USERRA 
requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for disabilities that arose during 
military service or were aggravated by military service. See id. § 4313(a)(3). The second is 
President Obama’s health care law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29, 
and 42 U.S.C.). A small provision of the ACA—which has been overshadowed by the more 
controversial parts of the law—requires employers to provide mothers who are breastfeeding 
with time and space to express milk. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (Supp. V 2011). Importantly, the 
law does not create a right of action for employees to bring a claim against employers who fall 
short of their obligations, which makes the provision more aspirational than enforceable. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006). 
 65. See J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1385, 1390 (2003) (“[A]n ‘accommodation’ mandate requires employers to make 
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discrimination jurisprudence. Say that an employee, a devout Jew, is 
unable to work her scheduled shift on a Saturday afternoon. She 
explains the conflict to her employer, noting that she cannot abide by 
her religious beliefs if she is required to work on the Sabbath. At this 
point, the employer is faced with a choice: adjust the work schedule if 
possible, or face the threat of a lawsuit. Say that the employer cannot 
make the requested change to the schedule, perhaps because doing so 
would greatly disrupt the whole work schedule and inconvenience 
many employees. In that situation, the requested accommodation 
would pose an “undue hardship,” thereby relieving the employer of 
any obligation to accommodate the employee.66 By contrast, if the 
employer can make the change without great difficulty, the law 
requires the employer to reschedule the employee so as to eliminate 
the conflict between her work obligations and her religious practice. 
Reasonable accommodation provides a more individualized 
protection than disparate treatment. Under a disparate treatment 
regime, the employer is prohibited from introducing bias into the 
workplace but bears no responsibility to tailor the job to the needs of 
its employees. Reasonable accommodation, by contrast, seeks to 
mold the job around the needs of the employee, when possible. 
Negotiation is integral to reasonable accommodation: employers and 
employees must come together to discuss their respective needs and 
expectations.67 By fostering collaboration in this way, reasonable 
accommodation turns conventional antidiscrimination discourse on its 
head. If, as Professor Christine Jolls describes it, “[t]he canonical idea 
of ‘antidiscrimination’ in the United States condemns the differential 
treatment of otherwise similarly situated individuals on the basis of 
 
costly exceptions to their merit-based criteria in order to increase employment opportunities for 
individuals who otherwise would be excluded.”). 
 66. Compare Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 272, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the accommodation of an employee’s beliefs would have imposed an undue 
hardship when the employee, a Jehovah’s Witness, worked as a truck driver and refused to 
make overnight runs with a woman who was not his wife, thereby limiting the number of trips 
he could make), with Vetter v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1446, 1449, 1456 (N.D. Iowa 
1995) (holding that an employer failed to sufficiently accommodate a Jewish employee’s request 
to live in a city with a synagogue, when the employer required the employee to live in his 
assigned sales territory and proposed a city without a synagogue), rev’d on other grounds, 120 
F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1997).  
 67. In a leading case in the disability context, the Seventh Circuit noted that “[o]nce an 
employer knows of an employee’s disability and the employee has requested reasonable 
accommodations, the ADA and its implementing regulations require that the parties engage in 
an interactive process to determine what precise accommodations are necessary.” Beck v. Univ. 
of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1137 (7th Cir. 1996).  
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race, sex, national origin, or other protected characteristics,”68 then 
reasonable accommodation marks a significant shift in the American 
antidiscrimination project. Specifically, it expands the idea of 
antidiscrimination to cover the unique ways in which individuals 
express their identities. 
B. Visions of Equality 
The fundamental goal of employment discrimination law is to 
promote equality in employment. Though it lies at the heart of 
American antidiscrimination law, equality is not a self-defining 
concept. Consider the following question: What does it mean to treat 
employees equally? How we answer this question reveals a great deal 
about our normative expectations of what wrongs employment 
discrimination law is supposed to remedy and how it should go about 
doing so. 
1. Equality as Sameness.  The dominant view of equality in 
employment discrimination law is based on the idea of sameness. The 
sameness model provides that employers should treat like people in a 
like manner.69 To satisfy this equality command, an employer must act 
as if it cannot—or at least does not—appreciate its employees’ 
identity traits.70 The idea that employers should blind themselves to 
their employees’ traits is deeply engrained in American 
antidiscrimination law.71 In his celebrated work Prejudicial 
Appearances, Professor Robert Post seeks to uncover the hidden logic 
of American antidiscrimination law.72 Post discovers that trait 
blindness is crucial to the inner workings of our antidiscrimination 
project: “Blindness,” he argues, “renders forbidden characteristics 
 
 68. Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 642, 643 (2001) (citing Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American 
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (2000)).  
 69. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 54, at 10 (“Under the sameness model, 
discrimination occurs when individuals who are fundamentally the same are treated differently 
for illegitimate reasons.”). 
 70. See Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of 
Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2003) (“The central thrust of Title 
VII employs a ‘sameness’ model of discrimination, requiring employers to treat African 
Americans and women exactly the same as others; their race and sex must be ignored and 
employers must focus instead on factors related to productivity.” (footnote omitted)). 
 71. See generally Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 
235 (1971) (discussing the origin and development of color blindness in antidiscrimination law).  
 72. ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 1 (2001). 
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invisible; it requires employers to base their judgments instead on the 
deeper and more fundamental ground of ‘individual merit’ or 
‘intrinsic worth.’”73 
Certain traits are designated off-limits as bases for an 
employment decision. The idea is that these traits—such as race, sex, 
and religion—are culturally salient and often trigger deeply held 
stereotypes and prejudices.74 Employment law takes these traits off 
the table, in the hope that restricting their influence in individual 
cases will, in the long run, lead to wholesale social change. 
2. Equality as Difference.  We can contrast the sameness model 
of equality with the difference model of equality. Whereas the 
sameness model seeks to create formal equality, the difference model 
is interested in creating substantive equality.75 It mandates that some 
people need to be treated differently to be treated equally.76 The 
difference model is the animating force behind reasonable 
accommodation. When an employer adjusts the workplace to meet 
the needs of a given employee, the employer is accounting for the 
employee’s difference—the characteristics that set the employee 
apart from her coworkers. Writing in the context of disability law, 
Professor Anna Kirkland argues that the ADA charts a new course 
for antidiscrimination law, specifically with respect to its conception 
of equality: “What is new is the turn to accommodations for 
difference and the acceptance that difference may be insoluble, and 
that ignoring it may be the height of oppression rather than the best 
hope for seeing past it.”77 
I want to break down the difference model into three 
interrelated ideas. First, employees are different. There is no such 
thing as a truly homogenous group: no two members of a group 
 
 73. Id. at 14. 
 74. See id. at 15. 
 75. ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 127 
(2008). 
 76. The best pronouncement of the difference principle comes from Justice Blackmun’s 
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the prominent 
affirmative action decision: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. 
There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them 
differently.” Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational 
Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 
825, 863–64 (2003); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why 
Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 609 (2001). 
 77. KIRKLAND, supra note 75, at 127. 
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express a protected trait in exactly the same way. Second, these 
differences matter. The experience of discrimination is all about the 
salience of an employee’s identity traits. Those who stand out—that 
is, those who are different from their peers—tend to be the primary 
targets of employment discrimination. At the same time, the thing 
that marks an employee as different is often integral to the 
employee’s sense of self. Finally, the law should protect employees 
because of their differences, not despite them. 
C. The Claim 
At this point, the necessary pieces are in place to preview my 
claim. In terms of restructuring sex discrimination law, I propose that 
sex discrimination law should take a page out of religious 
discrimination law’s playbook. Unlike the other kinds of employment 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII, religious discrimination adopts 
a vision of equality that incorporates notions of sameness and 
difference, blending them together to create a more holistic equality 
command. It can do this because it allows employees to raise 
reasonable accommodation as well as disparate treatment claims. 
Such a framework would likewise make sense in the context of sex 
discrimination. Like their peers in religious discrimination cases, 
employees experience sex discrimination both because of who they 
are (sex as status) and because of how they behave (sex as practice). 
This last point is important. My proposal rests on the idea that 
sex discrimination doctrine should reflect the experience of sex 
discrimination as it exists today rather than how it used to be. Modern 
sex discrimination is not easy. It is a highly subjective experience, 
often targeting a single employee. It cuts across identity traits, defying 
traditional notions of causation. And it is a product of work culture, 
burdening employees who do not fit in with their coworkers. The 
simple fact is that existing sex discrimination doctrine is not equipped 
to deal with these sorts of cases. It is time for a new sex discrimination 
regime. 
II.  SEX DISCRIMINATION AND GROUP NARRATIVES 
When Darlene Jespersen challenged Harrah’s new makeup 
policy, she faced an uncertain landscape. Because Jespersen’s claim 
focused on her appearance rather than her status as a woman, it did 
not fit easily among existing sex discrimination norms. The canonical 
case of sex discrimination is formal disparate treatment, in which an 
KRAMER IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2013  9:26 AM 
2014] THE NEW SEX DISCRIMINATION 909 
employment policy subjects women to worse treatment than men (or 
vice versa). Jespersen could not allege that she was treated differently 
because she is a woman, as the makeup policy applied to all female 
employees. Nor would it have been easy for her to prove that women 
fared worse than men under Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy, as the 
policy also had requirements that applied exclusively to men (for 
example, no makeup, no ponytails). Ultimately, what Jespersen 
wanted—to be free to work without having to wear makeup—is not 
the sort of remedy that existing sex discrimination norms can provide. 
This Part tells the story of why employees like Jespersen have 
such a difficult time raising actionable sex discrimination claims. It 
starts by discussing the complicated history of Title VII’s “sex” 
provision. Although this history is interesting in its own right, it is 
especially important for my purposes because courts have long used 
the history of the “sex” provision as a reason to narrow the reach of 
Title VII’s sex equality project. From there, this Part considers the 
issue of subgroup discrimination, an experience of discrimination that 
has confounded the courts since the early days of Title VII. In 
particular, this discussion zeroes in on what has proven to be at once 
the most elusive and most transformative theory of subgroup 
discrimination: the gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination. I 
use the gender-stereotyping theory as a catalyst to rethink Title VII’s 
sex equality project. The thrust of my argument is that, as a normative 
matter, Title VII should not define sex equality in terms of what is 
good for all or even most women (or men), but rather in terms of 
what individual men and women need to flourish in the workplace. 
This Part concludes by considering another important gap in 
existing sex discrimination norms: employees who face discrimination 
along multiple axes of bias. As a regulatory force, sex discrimination 
law tends to flatten identity, forcing employees to shed part of 
themselves so they can squeeze into discrete identity categories. I 
argue that sex discrimination law should instead seek to promote a 
vibrant conception of identity, one that is driven not by the strictures 
of doctrine but by the needs of individual employees. 
As a whole, this Part offers a wide-ranging critique of existing 
sex discrimination law, challenging the doctrinal rules, historical 
fictions, and normative values that anchor the law to narratives of 
group subordination. To develop this critique, this Part highlights the 
stories of victims of modern sex discrimination. Along the way, we 
meet transgender men and women, pregnant women, working 
mothers, gender-nonconforming men and women, crossdressers, 
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unmarried women, lesbians, and gay men, among others. These 
stories draw attention to a set of doctrinal pitfalls that, taken 
together, substantially limit the reach of Title VII’s sex equality 
project. These stories also show that sex discrimination law’s 
conception of identity leaves much to be desired. More than anything, 
though, these stories remind us that antidiscrimination law is about 
righting wrongs and providing relief, both in the legal and 
psychological sense of the term. These employees have been fired, 
harassed, humiliated, and otherwise disrespected. Some struggle just 
to get through the day, while others lose their livelihood altogether. 
Given what is at stake, we owe it to them, as well as to other 
employees who face similar circumstances, to do the work of 
antidiscrimination law as best we can. 
A. A Troubled History 
When Congress enacted Title VII, it embarked on an 
unprecedented journey with respect to sex discrimination. Not only 
was the sex provision the first of its kind, but it was seemingly 
boundless.78 After all, the text of Title VII never defines “sex” or 
“discrimination,” and the legislative history of the sex provision 
leaves unanswered the central question of all of sex discrimination 
law:79 What constitutes unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII? 
In the story that haunts employment discrimination law, Title 
VII’s sex provision is a quirk of history. The principal evil that the 
Civil Rights Act sought to remedy was, of course, race 
discrimination.80 Sex did not become a part of the Civil Rights Act 
until late in the legislative process, when Congressman Howard Smith 
proposed an amendment to add “sex” as a protected trait.81 Because 
the amendment came so late in the process, Congress did not hold 
hearings about sex equality in American society, nor did any 
 
 78. By Title VII’s “sex” provision, I refer to its prohibition on discrimination “because 
of . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 79. As Cary Franklin explains it, “It is a commonplace in employment discrimination law 
that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination has no legislative history.” Franklin, supra note 
43, at 1317. 
 80. See id. (“When President Kennedy decided in the summer of 1963, in the wake of the 
Birmingham riots, to pursue civil rights legislation, his aim was to secure legal protections 
against race discrimination.” (citing President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to 
the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/
Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHA-194-001.aspx)).  
 81. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Howard Smith). 
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committee issue a report about the scope of Smith’s proposed sex 
amendment. Except for a few hours of floor debate about the new 
provision, Congress was otherwise silent on the issue of sex 
discrimination. The prevailing view is that Smith, a staunch opponent 
of civil rights,82 proposed the amendment in the hope of killing the 
Civil Rights Act before it could become the law of the land.83 
Although the country may have been ambivalent about racial 
equality, there was no way people were going to support the Civil 
Rights Act if it also applied to sex, or so he thought. In the end, 
Smith’s plan backfired. When the Civil Rights Act became law, sex 
was right there alongside the other protected traits. 
This story is a trap. Like most good traps, it is attractive, luring 
unsuspecting victims into its clutches. It is hard not to be drawn into 
the idea that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination was never meant to 
be. Indeed, courts have taken the bait time and time again, relying on 
this story as a reason to narrow the reach of Title VII.84 As Professor 
Cary Franklin writes in a recent article, “[C]laims about the narrow 
mindset and goals of the Eighty-Eighth Congress have exerted a 
powerful regulative influence over the interpretation of Title VII’s 
sex provision.”85 Franklin is part of a growing chorus of scholars who 
have sought to correct the record on sex discrimination law’s history.86 
 
 82. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 84–90, 115–16 (1985); Franklin, supra note 43, at 1318 
& n.36.    
 83. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
14 (4th ed. 2007) (“[Smith] proposed the addition of the word ‘sex’ to Title VII’s list of 
impermissible bases for employment decisions. Smith hoped that by transforming the civil rights 
bill into a law guaranteeing women equal employment rights with men—thus drastically 
affecting virtually every employer, labor union, and governmental body in the country—the bill 
would become so controversial that it would fail, if not in the House, certainly in the Senate.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1220–22 (10th Cir. 2007) (relying 
on this story as a reason to reject a sex discrimination claim brought by a transgender 
employee); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084–85 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Willingham 
v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091–92 (5th Cir. 1975) (relying on this story as a 
reason to reject a sex discrimination claim brought by a male employee with long hair). 
 85. Franklin, supra note 43, at 1319. 
 86. See generally, e.g., Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at 
the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 137 (1997); Carl Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the 
Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37 
(1983); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The 
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995); Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got 
into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163 (1991). 
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Though their weapons are academic in nature, their fight has 
considerable real-world implications. Sex discrimination law is 
hamstrung by the story of a political ploy gone wrong. That Smith 
may have introduced the amendment to thwart civil rights does not 
tell us anything about why legislators ultimately voted in favor of the 
provision.87 And yet the story endures, fostering a narrow vision of 
sex equality that constrains Title VII’s capacity to respond to 
emerging forms of sex discrimination. 
This Section considers three instances in which sex 
discrimination’s history stands in the way of sex discrimination’s 
future. The first is discrimination against transgender employees. By 
their very existence, transgender employees pose a challenge to 
historical conceptions of sex and sex discrimination. Their identities 
demonstrate that sex is not immutable, and their discrimination 
claims suggest that sex discrimination is not as simple as treating all 
men and women equally. In this regard, they are the poster children 
for the new sex discrimination. I also consider two other instances in 
which sex discrimination’s past inhibits its future—discrimination 
against pregnant women and women who are breastfeeding. 
Technically distinct experiences of discrimination, the pregnancy and 
breastfeeding cases nevertheless belong together. Not only do both 
revolve around motherhood, but in both instances the doctrine rests 
on a suspect claim about the history of sex discrimination. 
1. Transgender Employees.  In 1981, Eastern Airlines fired a pilot 
who had been with the company for over a decade.88 The reason for 
the termination was that the employee had undergone sex 
reassignment surgery without the company’s knowledge.89 Hired in 
 
 87. Smith’s amendment passed by a teller vote of 168 to 133. “During a teller vote 
members vote by turning in signed index cards: green for yea and red for nay. Since 1993, 
[t]eller [v]otes may occur in the House only when the electronic voting system is broken.” C-
Span Congressional Glossary, C-SPAN.ORG, http://legacy.c-span.org/guide/congress/glossary/
tellervt.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
  To the larger issue of legislative intent, it is dangerous to impute one legislator’s 
motivations to a larger deliberative body, especially when legislators are not asked specifically 
why they voted the way they did. The text of the statute—in this case Title VII—is a better 
indicator of legislative intent than one legislator’s intentions, even if the legislator proposed the 
law under consideration. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29–36 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
(arguing that courts should not look to legislative history to interpret statutes). 
 88. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082–83. 
 89. Id. at 1083. 
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1968 as Kenneth Ulane, a decorated Army pilot who served in 
Vietnam, the pilot was fired in 1981 as Karen Frances Ulane.90 The 
airline could not argue that Karen lacked the requisite experience or 
qualifications to fly because, despite her new appearance, Karen was 
the same pilot she was before the surgery. At the time, transgender 
discrimination was still a new issue for the courts. Yet Ulane’s case 
presented a unique opportunity to fold transgender discrimination 
into sex discrimination law. After all, Ulane was her own comparator. 
What better example of sex discrimination than an employer who is 
willing to employ a man but not a woman, when the man and the 
woman are the same person?91 
The court did not see it that way. The Seventh Circuit held that 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination did not reach a claim 
brought by a transgender person.92 History was not on Ulane’s side. 
According to the court, “[O]ur responsibility is to interpret this 
congressional legislation and determine what Congress intended 
when it decided to outlaw discrimination based on sex.”93 From there, 
the court surveyed the thin legislative history of Title VII’s sex 
provision.94 It called the sex provision a “gambit” and a “ploy” 
designed to “scuttle the adoption of the Civil Rights Act,” which 
ultimately led to sex being “abruptly added to the statute’s 
prohibition against race discrimination.”95 Taken together, the 
“circumstances of the amendment’s adoption” and its “total lack of 
legislative history” led the court to the following conclusion: 
“Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation 
apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex.”96 
Let us step back for a moment to consider what the court meant 
by the “traditional concept” of sex, as well as what it means for the 
 
 90. Id. at 1082–83. 
 91. I have always been fond of how Professors Bill Eskridge and Nan Hunter frame the 
issue in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984): “What could be stronger 
proof of sex discrimination in the firing of [a] woman for a job held by a man, than the fact that 
the man and the woman are the same person?” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, 
SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW: TEACHER’S MANUAL 193 (2d ed. 2004). 
 92. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084, 1086–87. 
 93. Id. at 1084. 
 94. Id. at 1085–86. 
 95. Id. at 1085. 
 96. Id. (emphasis added). 
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contours of sex discrimination law.97 Once again, Professor Cary 
Franklin’s writing on the history of sex discrimination is instructive. 
Franklin argues that the idea that there is a traditional concept of sex 
discrimination is problematic for two reasons. First, the traditional 
concept of sex discrimination is an invented tradition, not one that is 
deeply rooted in sex discrimination law.98 In this regard, Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines, Inc.99 is part of a long string of cases that not only 
refer to but also directly rely on a history that never actually 
occurred. Second, because it appeals to an invented tradition, the 
traditional concept of sex discrimination serves to narrow the scope of 
Title VII’s sex equality project.100 We can see this at work in Ulane’s 
case. The court rejected an emergent manifestation of sex 
discrimination because it did not conform to what the court thought 
of as the classic manifestation of sex discrimination, namely, formal 
rules that treat men and women differently.101 Thus we can think of 
Ulane as part of a sustained effort to weaken the normative force of 
sex discrimination, an effort that is as old as Title VII itself and 
continues to the present day. 
Now turn back to the court’s reasoning in Ulane. In rejecting 
Ulane’s claim, the court cited a handful of transgender discrimination 
cases that likewise rejected employees’ sex discrimination claims on 
largely historical grounds.102 Together with Ulane, these cases form 
the transgender discrimination canon. The thread unifying these cases 
is a concern about group narratives. The reason that these employees 
lost their cases was because they could not map their claims onto a 
narrative of group subordination—they could not, in other words, 
 
 97. The content of employment discrimination law depends on the scope of the protected 
trait in question. To assess the past, present, and future of sex discrimination law, we have to 
decide what we mean by sex. Put simply, there is no sex discrimination without sex. 
 98. Franklin, supra note 43, at 1312. 
 99. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 100. See Franklin, supra note 43, at 1315–16 (noting that courts “in the 1970s obscured [sex 
discrimination’s] history” and “adopted the tightly circumscribed definition of sex 
discrimination offered by employers in the 1960s”). 
 101. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085–86 (explaining that “Title VII . . . in its plain meaning, 
implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and against 
men because they are men” and that “if Congress believes that transsexuals should enjoy the 
protection of Title VII, it may so provide . . .  [but] we decline . . . to judicially expand the 
definition of sex as used in Title VII beyond its common and traditional interpretation”). 
 102. Id. at 1084 (citing Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per 
curiam)); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326–27 (5th Cir. 1978); Holloway v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 
403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff’d mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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show that the discrimination they faced was bad for all men or all 
women.103 In the eyes of their respective courts, these employees faced 
a form of niche discrimination: most men and women do not take 
hormones and undergo sex reassignment surgery, nor do they dress 
and self-identify as a sex different than their birth sex. For these 
courts, transgender employees cease to be men and women; they are 
first and foremost transgender persons, wholly defined by their most 
marginalizing trait.104 Once ascribed with the transgender label, these 
employees find themselves shut out of sex discrimination law.105 
There are signs that judicial attitudes toward transgender 
discrimination may be softening, however. In recent years, two new 
theories of sex discrimination have emerged for transgender 
employees. The first allows transgender plaintiffs to raise actionable 
claims based on their gender nonconformity. For instance, in one 
prominent case, Smith v. City of Salem,106 a preoperative male-to-
female transsexual was suspended from her job as a firefighter after 
she began appearing in the workplace as a woman.107 The court held 
that the employee could sustain a sex claim based on a gender-
stereotyping theory108—a theory I discuss in great detail below.109 
 
 103. See Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 (explaining that “discrimination based on one’s 
transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview of the Act” and that the defendant 
must also “protect[] the privacy interests of its female employees”); Smith, 569 F.2d at 327 
(reasoning that “Congress by its proscription of sex discrimination intended only to guarantee 
equal job opportunities for males and females,” and that Title VII did not extend to the 
plaintiff’s questionable situation in which he was not hired because he was “effeminate”); 
Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663 (declining to extend Title VII protection to transsexuals because 
Congress intended to “restrict the term ‘sex’ to the traditional meaning” and because the 
“purpose of Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination in employment is to ensure that 
men and women are treated equally”); Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 457 (“[E]mployment 
discrimination based on one’s transsexualism is not, nor was intended by the Congress to be, 
proscribed by Title VII . . . .”). 
 104. Sociologists refer to this phenomenon as a “master status,” a social identity that 
overshadows all other aspects of a person’s identity. See Everett Cherrington Hughes, Dilemmas 
and Contradictions of Status, 50 AM. J. SOC. 353, 357 (1945) (coining the term “master status” in 
the context of race). In his work on homosexuality, sociologist Wayne Brekhus usefully 
describes a master status as an “identity monopoly.” WAYNE H. BREKHUS, PEACOCKS, 
CHAMELEONS, CENTAURS: GAY SUBURBIA AND THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 36 
(2003) (emphasis omitted). 
 105. My earlier work describes this experience in greater depth. See Zachary A. Kramer, 
Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 219–20 (2009) (arguing that 
homosexuality, as a master status, causes lesbians and gay men to be shut out of sex 
discrimination law). 
 106. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 107. Id. at 569. 
 108. Id. at 572. 
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According to the court, “[E]mployers who discriminate against men 
because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act 
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the 
discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”110 
The obvious upside of the court’s reasoning is that it provides a 
viable route to recovery, one that can be followed by transgender 
employees in the future. But it comes at a cost. The court’s reasoning 
effectively erases transgenderism as an identity. Although the 
employee was asserting a female identity in the workplace, to avail 
herself of the gender-stereotyping theory she had to take on a male 
identity, namely, as a man who wanted to participate in the workplace 
dressing and looking like a woman. As one commentator notes of the 
case, “Transsexuals or transgender people per se do not really exist in 
the Smith opinion; there just happen to be some men out there who 
want to wear dresses.”111 
A second case worth mentioning involves an employee who 
applied for a research position with the Library of Congress.112 The 
employee applied in her capacity as a man and received an offer,113 
but the offer was rescinded after the employer learned that the 
employee planned to join the workplace as a woman.114 The court in 
this case compared the employee’s situation to that of an employee 
who is in the process of converting from one religion to another.115 As 
the court noted, Title VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination 
would certainly protect an employee who faces discrimination 
because of a religious conversion.116 Like a religious convert, the 
transgender employee in this case was transitioning from one extant 
identity to another,117 both of which fall within Title VII’s prohibition 
against sex discrimination.118 It thus follows that discrimination aimed 
 
 109. See infra Part II.B. 
 110. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574. 
 111. KIRKLAND, supra note 75, at 86. 
 112. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 113. Id. at 296. 
 114. Id. at 299. 
 115. Id. at 306. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 295. 
 118. Id. at 306–07; see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) 
(“Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ protects men as well as women.”).  
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at a transgender employee constitutes sex discrimination under Title 
VII.119 
It is important to remember that these cases are exceptions to 
the prevailing rule, at once a vision of a brighter future and a 
reminder of how far we are from realizing this vision. A 2007 case in 
Utah drives home the point. The plaintiff in the case, a male-to-
female transsexual, worked as a city bus driver in Salt Lake City.120 If 
they needed to use the bathroom during their shift, bus drivers had to 
use public facilities on their route,121 and the Utah Transit Authority 
made arrangements with businesses for drivers to use their 
restrooms.122 The plaintiff was fired after her supervisor discovered 
that she was using female public bathrooms while wearing a work 
uniform.123 Siding with the employer, the court framed the case in 
terms of group harms: the city’s policy was permissible because it did 
not disadvantage one sex more than the other.124 And, once again, 
history proved to be an obstacle, with the court explicitly citing Ulane 
and other decisions in the transgender discrimination canon as 
controlling authority for the rule that Title VII does not protect 
transsexuals as a class.125 
2. Pregnant Women and New Mothers.  The thinness of the sex 
provision’s legislative history also played a major role in the outcome 
of the pregnancy cases in the 1970s. In the span of a few short years, 
sex discrimination law was turned on its head, and then back again, 
with respect to pregnancy discrimination. The battle over pregnancy 
discrimination started with the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in 
 
 119. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308. Liz Glazer and I discuss transitional identity in greater 
detail in Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional Discrimination, 18 TEMP. POL. 
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651 (2009). 
 120. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 121. Id. at 1219, 1224. 
 122. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *2 (D. Utah 
2005), aff’d 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 123. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219. 
 124. See id. at 1221–22. 
 125. Id. I distinguish between sex and gender discrimination below. See infra Part II.B. The 
former focuses on bodies, targeting an employee’s maleness or femaleness. The latter, by 
contrast, focuses on an employee’s masculinity or femininity. The difference between the two 
has proved to be one of the thorniest, and yet most exciting, areas of sex discrimination law in 
recent years. I argue below that, as a legal theory, gender-stereotyping paves the way for a new 
way of thinking about sex equality, namely, that sex discrimination law should shield employees 
against gender norms that seek to dampen constitutive elements of an employee’s identity. 
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General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.126 Gilbert involved a challenge to 
General Electric’s (GE) disability benefits program.127 As a general 
matter, GE’s disability program covered male and female employees 
equally.128 The plan did not, however, cover pregnancy and related 
conditions.129 As the Court saw it, GE’s disability plan divided the 
workforce into two groups: “pregnant women and nonpregnant 
persons.”130 Although the former group was made up entirely of 
women, the latter group included both men and women, thereby 
making it hard to compare how the two groups fared under the 
disability plan.131 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that GE’s disability 
plan did not run afoul of Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination.132 What matters most is how the Court reached this 
decision. It started by looking at the legislative history of Title VII’s 
sex provision, observing that the history is “notable primarily for its 
brevity.”133 Without a strong statement of legislative purpose on which 
to rely, the Court looked for guidance in its race discrimination 
jurisprudence.134 “Discrimination,” according to the Court, means 
 
 126. Gen. Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). To be exact, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 
U.S. 484 (1974), was the first case to raise pregnancy discrimination, in 1974. Geduldig involved 
an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a provision of the California insurance code, which 
exempted pregnancy from the state’s disability insurance program. Id. at 489. The Court 
concluded that the pregnancy provision was constitutionally permissible because it did not 
differentiate between men and women. Id. at 496–97. So long as the state did not treat men and 
women differently, it could subject a subclass of women to less favorable treatment. Though it 
was an Equal Protection Clause case, Geduldig laid the foundation for the Court’s decision in 
Gilbert two years later. 
 127. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 127–28. 
 128. Id. at 130, 138. 
 129. Id. at 128. 
 130. Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 136. 
 133. Id. at 143. 
 134. Id. at 145. Specifically, the Court relied on Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and 
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145. Mancari involved a due 
process challenge to a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) rule that gave an employment preference 
for qualified Indians. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541. Upholding the rule, the Court held that the 
preference was a political rather than a racial preference. Id. at 553–54. For a critique of 
Mancari’s racial/political distinction, see generally Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: 
Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958 (2011). 
  Ozawa involved a challenge by a Japanese man to the Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 
3592, 34 Stat. 596 (repealed 1940), which allowed “white persons” and “persons of African 
descent” to become naturalized citizens but made no mention of persons of Asian descent. 
Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 191–93. The plaintiff argued that he qualified as white for purposes of the 
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something specific, having been developed by the courts for almost a 
century.135 Reluctant to break new ground, the Court refused to 
endorse any definition of discrimination that was “different from 
what the concept of discrimination has traditionally meant.”136 But 
what did “discrimination” traditionally mean? The answer, of course, 
is that “discrimination” means formal discrimination, where 
employers divide employees into discrete groups. 
The story gets more complicated from there. Gilbert is that rare 
case that confirms that Congress listens when the Court speaks. Just 
two years after the Court handed down Gilbert, Congress passed the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).137 The PDA explicitly 
overturned Gilbert by amending Title VII to “prohibit sex 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.”138 The statute further 
defines its scope as reaching discrimination on the basis of 
“pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”139 Most 
important for my purposes, however, was the Court’s explanation—in 
a later case interpreting the PDA—that Congress also disapproved of 
Gilbert’s “test of discrimination.”140 This, of course, is a reference to 
the Gilbert Court’s conclusion that sex discrimination be understood 
as the formal division of the sexes into two groups. 
By all accounts, the PDA should have put Gilbert to rest. Yet the 
decision continues to play a major role in sex discrimination law, 
preventing Title VII from intervening in current controversies. 
Gilbert operates as what Professor Deborah Widiss calls a “shadow 
precedent,” a case that courts continue to follow even though it is no 
longer good law.141 Widiss demonstrates that lower courts act as if 
 
law. Id. at 195. The Court concluded that the plaintiff was “clearly of a race which is not 
Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone on the negative side.” Id. at 198. 
 135. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145 (“The concept of ‘discrimination,’ of course, was well 
known at the time of the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth 
Amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of judicial construction.”).  
 136. Id. 
 137. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).  
 140. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983). 
 141. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory 
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 515 (2009). 
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Congress never enacted the PDA, sometimes even citing Gilbert as 
controlling authority.142 
We can see this dynamic at work in cases involving 
discrimination against female employees who are breastfeeding. Like 
pregnancy, breastfeeding is a uniquely female experience. And also 
like pregnancy, it does not affect all female employees, which means 
that it creates a subclass of female employees. The breastfeeding 
example is especially useful because it highlights the individualized 
nature of modern sex discrimination, as the employee is seeking to 
mold the workplace around her unique needs. 
Consider a prominent example.143 The plaintiff, a news producer 
for MSNBC, returned to work shortly after giving birth to her son.144 
Because she was breastfeeding, the plaintiff wanted a private space 
where she could pump.145 Initially, MSNBC let her use an empty 
editing room.146 But her coworkers, who did not know the room was 
occupied, eventually tried to enter the room while she was using it.147 
Despite her requests, MSNBC was unable to provide the plaintiff 
with a suitable alternative space to pump.148 This led to a larger 
conflict about scheduling, and the plaintiff ultimately resigned her 
position.149 
She sued and lost. The district court concluded that the “drawing 
of distinctions among persons of one gender on the basis of criteria 
that are immaterial to the other . . . is not the sort of behavior covered 
by Title VII.”150 This tracks the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gilbert, 
limiting the reach of sex discrimination law to employment policies 
that divide men and women into distinct groups. The court did not 
stop there, however. As a means of lending historical force to its 
ruling, the court explained that this rule was “was made clear more 
than twenty years ago in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.”151 It is as if 
the PDA never existed. 
 
 142. See id. at 553–56 (demonstrating that courts, in cases involving breastfeeding and 
prescription contraception, still rely on Gilbert). 
 143. Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 144. Id. at 306–07. 
 145. Id. at 307. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 308. 
 150. Id. at 309. 
 151. Id. 
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Stepping back, the larger point I want to make about history is 
that sex discrimination law is haunted by the ghosts of its early cases. 
These cases settled on a specific idea about what does and does not 
count as sex discrimination, and that idea has become so 
commonplace that courts act as if it were embedded in the DNA of 
sex discrimination law. I want to push back against the idea that the 
traditional conception of sex discrimination should continue to 
undergird Title VII. However entrenched it may seem, this idea is not 
essential to Title VII’s sex equality project. There is nothing in the 
language of the statute—nor, for that matter, is there anything in the 
actual legislative history of the law—that limits Title VII to such a 
narrow conception of discrimination. And yet the idea persists 
because it is tied to a historical account of the sex provision that is 
suspect at best. 
It has been almost fifty years since the Civil Rights Act became 
law, and in that time sex discrimination—and by this I mean the lived 
experience of sex discrimination—has evolved into something new. 
Sex discrimination law has not kept pace with the changing nature of 
sex discrimination. At its most fundamental level, antidiscrimination 
law is in the business of creating change—to change people’s attitudes 
about each other, to change the way employers organize their 
workplaces, and to change the social structure of society at large. To 
bring about the kinds of change needed today, sex discrimination law 
must also change. It can start by moving past its own troubled history. 
B. Subgroups and Stereotypes 
Since the early days of Title VII, courts have been confounded 
by the issue of subgroup discrimination. Some of the earliest sex 
discrimination cases were brought by flight attendants—or 
stewardesses, as the job was called back then—who were challenging 
the airline industry’s discriminatory practices toward women.152 To 
cultivate the dual image of flight attendants as both potential bride 
and sex object,153 the airlines went to great lengths to control their 
 
 152. In her wonderful book, Femininity in Flight, historian Kathleen Barry documents in 
great detail the early Title VII litigation involving female flight attendants. See generally 
KATHLEEN M. BARRY, FEMININITY IN FLIGHT: A HISTORY OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS (2007). 
 153. Barry describes the shift of the stewardess ideal from daring adventurer to glamour 
icon to, ultimately, a potential homemaker for passengers, a genuine “bride school.” Id. at 42–
53. Another commentator notes that airlines eventually sought to hire stewardesses who were 
“young, beautiful, and single in order to attract the predominantly male customers.” Toni Scott 
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employees’ private lives. Marriage154 and pregnancy155 were grounds 
for dismissal, and the airlines forced flight attendants to retire when 
they reached a certain age, usually between thirty and thirty-five.156 
The airlines were not engaging in wholesale discrimination against all 
women. Rather, they were discriminating against some women. 
Within the subgroup of women who work as flight attendants, the 
rules drew distinctions between single women and married women, as 
well as between older women and younger women. 
Subgroup discrimination is not always defined by job categories, 
however. Another prominent form of subgroup discrimination occurs 
when an employer targets some women (or men) because they 
have—or do not have—a particular trait. For instance, say an 
employer will hire men with school-aged children but not women with 
school-aged children.157 Even though the employer may not have a 
policy against hiring women as a general matter, this specific rule 
disadvantages a subgroup of women (women with school-aged 
children).158 A leading antidiscrimination scholar, Kimberly Yuracko, 
has coined the phrase “trait discrimination” to describe the 
experience of discrimination in these subgroup cases.159 The label is 
especially valuable because it captures the essence of subgroup 
 
Reed, Flight Attendant Furies: Is Title VII Really the Solution to Hiring Policy Problems?, 58 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 267, 270 (1992). She goes on:  
The stewardess, as the ultimate sales pitch, had to be the ultimate woman. Many 
airlines required that flight attendants be women under 25 years of age, under 115 
pounds, and under 5 feet 4 inches. The stewardess became the image of the industry 
and the lure for air traveling businessman.  
Id. (footnote omitted).  
 154. See, e.g., Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781, 781 (E.D. La. 1967) 
(involving a challenge to Delta’s rule prohibiting flight attendants from getting married). During 
the Cooper litigation, a Delta witness testified that single women made better stewardesses than 
married women for a variety of reasons: they gained better acceptance among passengers, they 
could easily change their schedules, and they had a lower likelihood of becoming pregnant. Id. 
at 782. Other cases involving no-marriage rules include the following: Sprogis v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971); Lansdale v. United Airlines, Inc., 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 
1971); and Evenson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1967). 
 155. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff’d, 700 F.2d 695 
(11th Cir. 1982); Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 689 (E.D. Va. 
1976), aff’d, 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). 
 156. In Cooper, for example, Delta would not employ stewardesses after their thirty-fifth 
birthdays. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. at 782. 
 157. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971). 
 158. Id. at 544. 
 159. Yuracko, supra note 19, at 170 (“An employer may be perfectly willing to hire women 
or men but may simply refuse to hire women or men with particular traits. I refer to this as trait 
discrimination.”). 
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discrimination: discrimination based on sex plus some other trait.160 
The other trait can be another protected trait, like race,161 or an 
unprotected trait, like whether the employee has short or long hair.162 
Within subgroup discrimination, the thorniest issue concerns the 
scope of the gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination. The 
gender-stereotyping theory has its roots in a 1989 Supreme Court 
decision, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. The case revolved around 
Ann Hopkins’s unsuccessful partnership bid at the consulting firm 
Price Waterhouse. Hopkins had worked for the firm for five years 
before applying for the promotion to partner.163 Of the eighty-eight 
employees up for partnership that year, Hopkins was the only 
woman.164 In fact, had she been successful, Hopkins would have been 
only the eighth female partner at the firm, out of 662 partners then 
affiliated with the firm.165 As part of its review process, Price 
Waterhouse solicited feedback about the candidates from partners 
across the country, even from partners who had little to no contact 
with the applicant.166 
The feedback on Hopkins revealed that the partners were 
conflicted about her candidacy. On the one hand, the partners viewed 
her work product favorably, citing in particular her work landing, 
almost singlehandedly, a lucrative contract with the federal 
 
 160. Yuracko distinguishes between sex-neutral and sex-specific trait discrimination. Id. An 
example of the former would be a rule against hiring anyone with, say, a tattoo—a rule that cuts 
across sex lines, making it sex neutral. An example of the latter would be an employer who 
“may find a particular trait disqualifying only in individuals of one sex (e.g., crew cuts on women 
or long hair on men).” Id. For purposes of this paper, I am only concerned with sex-specific trait 
discrimination. 
 161. See, e.g., Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel Ltd. P’ship, No. Civ.A.99-3891, 2000 WL 
1610775, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000) (involving an employer who refused to hire a black 
woman who had dyed her hair blonde); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (involving an employer who prohibited an African American female from 
wearing her hair in cornrows). 
 162. See Tavora v. NY Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (involving an 
employer who required male employees, but not female employees, to have short hair); 
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1975) (involving an 
employer who would employ women, but not men, with long hair); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of 
Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1358 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (involving an employer who required men to 
have short hair but had no such rule for women).  
 163. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded 
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 232. 
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government.167 On the other hand, the partners voiced concerns about 
Hopkins’s interactions with coworkers. The partners depicted 
Hopkins as difficult to work with and rude to support staff.168 It was 
these latter comments, about Hopkins’s so-called “interpersonal 
skills,”169 that raised the specter of sex discrimination. The partners 
said that she was “macho,” that she “overcompensated for being a 
woman,” and that she needed “a course at charm school.”170 Perhaps 
the most critical fact, however, was the advice given to Hopkins about 
how she could improve her chances for making partner in the 
future.171 She was told to “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.”172 
Hopkins sued Price Waterhouse under Title VII, alleging sex 
discrimination. The case made its way to the Supreme Court, where 
the Court ultimately sided with Hopkins. In many ways, the case was 
easy for the Court. As Justice Brennan wrote for a plurality of the 
Court, “[I]f an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be 
corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is 
the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the 
criticism.”173 But the Court went deeper than that, offering a 
seemingly broad theory of sex discrimination. “In the specific context 
of sex stereotyping,” Justice Brennan wrote, “an employer who acts 
on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she 
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”174 This marked a 
significant change in the nature of sex discrimination jurisprudence, 
which up until Price Waterhouse had been focused primarily on status 
discrimination, that is, discrimination against an employee in her 
capacity as a woman (or his capacity as a man). Recognizing that it 
was breathing new life into sex discrimination law, the Court 
bolstered its legal rule by declaring that “we are beyond the day when 
 
 167. Id. at 233. 
 168. Id. at 235. 
 169. Id. at 234–35. 
 170. Id. at 235. 
 171. Id. Incidentally, the man who offered this advice, Thomas Beyer, was Hopkins’s 
mentor at the firm and the chief supporter of her candidacy for partner. See ANN BRANIGAR 
HOPKINS, SO ORDERED: MAKING PARTNER THE HARD WAY 147–48, 213 (1996). The Court 
used this advice as evidence of discriminatory intent; it was more likely evidence of a supporter 
trying to counsel a candidate on how to navigate a tricky political situation. 
 172. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
 173. Id. at 256. 
 174. Id. at 250. 
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an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that 
they matched the stereotype associated with their group.”175 
Note how the Court’s reasoning recast the relationship between 
the employee and the employee’s group. Rather than formally 
comparing men and women as groups, the Court’s definition of 
discrimination focused on how the particular employee failed to live 
up to the employer’s idea about how men or women are supposed to 
look and act. The discriminatory comparison is therefore between the 
employee and a stereotypical employee, a heuristic rather than a real 
person. Moreover, Price Waterhouse pushes Title VII beyond the 
realm of biological sex to capture the performative aspects of an 
employee’s identity. In this regard, the decision echoes the work of 
feminist scholars who sought to disaggregate sex and gender176—the 
former refers to biological differences between men and women, 
whereas the latter describes the cultural expressions of masculinity 
and femininity.177 Although Hopkins was the only woman up for 
partnership that year, she stumbled not because she was a woman but 
because of how she performed her womanhood in the workplace—
what she wore, how she walked, how she talked. Price Waterhouse 
was indeed a watershed moment in the arc of sex discrimination law. 
After Price Waterhouse, writes Professor Katherine Franke, “bodies 
have dropped out of the equation.”178 
1. Contested Terrain.  In practice, the gender-stereotyping theory 
has proven to be a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the theory has 
been a source of novel victories for outsider employees. For instance, 
lesbian and gay employees,179 transgender employees,180 and working 
 
 175. Id. at 251. 
 176. See generally, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and 
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 
(1995); Franke, supra note 86. 
 177. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“The word ‘gender’ has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal 
characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, 
gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine is to male.”). 
 178. Franke, supra note 86, at 95. 
 179. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc) (gay man); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 407 (D. Mass. 2002) (same); Heller v. 
Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1216 (D. Or. 2002) (lesbian woman). 
 180. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of 
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 567 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
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mothers181 have all used the gender-stereotyping theory as a means to 
remedy sex discrimination. On the other hand, other outsider 
employees, sometimes the very same groups of outsider employees 
who have had success with the theory, have found that the theory 
frustrated their cases, with courts concluding that such employees are 
trying to “bootstrap” protection for unprotected traits.182 The 
doctrinal confusion over the theory—the struggle over whether it is a 
pioneering step for sex discrimination law or the basis for a suspicious 
litigation tactic—exists because the normative underpinnings of the 
theory remain elusive. When the Supreme Court declared that sex 
stereotyping violated Title VII, it never really explained why.183 
Stepping into this void, scholars have offered different ways of 
thinking about the gender-stereotyping theory in particular and 
subgroup discrimination more generally. I want to highlight two such 
scholarly perspectives as a means of distinguishing my own account, 
which I develop in the following Section. These scholars offer 
competing visions of how and why the gender-stereotyping theory 
works, and they do so by considering the analogue to Ann Hopkins’s 
masculine woman: a man in a dress. 
The first comes from Professor Mary Anne Case, who, a few 
years after the Court handed down Price Waterhouse, wrote an 
influential article on effeminate men in sex discrimination law. Case 
argues, simply but elegantly, that “the world will not be safe for 
women in frilly pink dresses—they will not, for example, generally be 
as respected as either men or women in gray flannel suits—unless and 
until it is made safe for men in dresses as well.”184 Case’s perspective is 
rooted in the goal of protecting “the stereotypically feminine” from 
 
 181. See, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45–48 (1st Cir. 2009); Back v. 
Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 117–24 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Nev. 
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (taking judicial notice of the stereotype 
that women and not men are responsible for family caregiving). 
 182. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 2007); Dawson 
v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–20 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 183. My explanation for why the Court did not develop a normative account to go along 
with its doctrinal ruling is because Hopkins’s case was too easy. Given the facts of her case, 
Hopkins clearly faced discrimination “because of” sex. She was the only woman up for partner 
that year, at a firm with relatively few female partners. Not only was the firm’s glass ceiling 
visible, but the partners did little to conceal their motivations for not pursuing Hopkins’s 
candidacy, namely, that she was not the kind of woman they wanted as a partner. Had she 
dressed and acted differently, there would not have been any need for litigation. Hopkins 
herself tells the story of her career and quest for partnership at Price Waterhouse in her 
autobiography. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 171. 
 184. Case, supra note 176, at 7. 
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becoming enshrined in law and culture as being less worthy of respect 
than traits traditionally coded as masculine.185 Importantly, Case does 
not endorse a sameness model of sex equality, nor, for that matter, 
does she see her intervention as making a difference-based 
argument.186 Instead, Case argues for melding the two approaches, 
with respect to equality of the sexes, by disaggregating gender from 
sex and by allowing both men and women to express both masculine 
and feminine behaviors and identities.187 As she describes it, the goal 
of Case’s project is “to make the world safe for us all, norms and 
exceptions, men and women, masculine and feminine, and every 
shade in between.”188 
We can contrast Case’s view with that of Yuracko’s, who 
articulates a different vision of the theory in her work on trait 
discrimination.189 Whereas Case sees value in protecting men in “frilly 
pink dresses,” Yuracko questions whether sex discrimination should 
protect such behaviors. She argues that it means something different 
when a woman wears a dress than when a man does.190 “All gender 
norms . . . are not created equal,”191 Yuracko argues. Therefore, she 
continues, “[e]mployers may recognize some norms without impeding 
[sex] equality in the workplace.”192 The problem with trait neutrality, 
Yuracko argues, is that we lose sight of the real harms of sex 
discrimination—norms that prevent men or women from being full 
and active participants in the workplace.193 This is why she is reluctant 
 
 185. Id. at 3. 
 186. Id. at 102–03. 
 187. Id. at 103. 
 188. Id. at 105. 
 189. See Yuracko, supra note 19, at 179–204.  
 190. See id. at 188 (“In a gendered society, women and men simply cannot possess the same 
trait in precisely the same way.”); id. at 196 (“In a sexist society, nothing done by men and 
women has precisely the same meaning. Traits are not understood or viewed as isolated 
technical attributes. They are necessarily viewed in relation to all of the other traits an 
individual possesses and through a systematically gendered lens.”). 
 191. Id. at 201. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. at 202 (“Allowing employers to act on the gender norm that makes men in 
dresses seem deviant does not impede the ability of men (or women) to participate fully and 
effectively in the work world.”). Later, she proposes a vision of sex discrimination based on 
what she calls the “power–access approach.” Id. at 225. The thrust of the power–access 
approach is as follows: “The power–access approach treats as actionable sex discrimination only 
those forms of sex-specific trait discrimination that are based on gender norms or scripts that 
inhibit the ability of individuals of a particular sex to participate successfully in the work world.” 
Id. 
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to protect the man in the dress against discrimination. “[M]en are not 
disadvantaged in the work world by being forced to mimic the 
clothing style of the ideal male worker,” she writes.194 Though such a 
rule will disadvantage “some men,”195—namely, men who wear 
women’s clothing—Yuracko is more concerned with the “substantive 
sex equality that is Title VII’s goal,”196 from which she seems to adopt 
a group-centric conception of equality. 
2. Rethinking Sex Equality.  The example of the man in a dress is 
not just some abstract hypothetical. In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, 
Inc.,197 Peter Oiler lost his job as a truck driver for the grocery chain 
Winn-Dixie after his boss discovered that Oiler was cross-dressing 
during his off-hours.198 Oiler is a good case with which to rethink Title 
VII’s commitment to sex equality, specifically with respect to Title 
VII’s antistereotyping principle. The thrust of my argument is that, as 
a normative matter, Title VII should not define sex equality in terms 
of what is good for all or even most women (or men), but rather in 
terms of what individual men and women need to flourish in the 
workplace. To make this point, I borrow an idea from Case’s account 
of sex equality, and I disagree with one from Yuracko’s account of 
sex equality. 
Let us start, however, with the nature of the discrimination faced 
by Peter Oiler. Winn-Dixie did not have a formal rule prohibiting 
men from wearing women’s clothing.199 Instead, the company applied 
an ad hoc rule once it discovered Oiler’s secret life as a cross-
dresser.200 In this sense, Oiler was in a class all by himself; he was 
targeted because of the way he, as an individual, performed his 
manhood. The company was, no doubt, operating on the basis of a 
stereotype: men should not wear women’s clothing. Prescriptive in 
 
 194. Id. at 202. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 
16, 2002). 
 198. Id. at *2. 
 199. See id. (“[Oiler] was not terminated because he violated any Winn-Dixie on-duty dress 
code.”). 
 200. See id. (noting that the defendants fired Oiler because the owners believed “that if 
Winn-Dixie’s customers learned of plaintiff’s lifestyle, i.e., that he regularly crossdressed and 
impersonated a woman in public, they would shop elsewhere and Winn-Dixie would lose 
business”). 
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nature,201 the stereotype not only dictates appropriate behavior—a 
“real” man wears men’s clothing—but also punishes those who fail to 
conform to this behavior. This highlights the defining characteristic of 
modern discrimination. Whereas earlier forms of discrimination 
focused on an employee’s status as a member of a group, modern 
discrimination has more to do with work-culture norms and the ways 
in which an employee’s behavior violates these norms. After all, not 
all outsiders face discrimination in the workplace. Discriminators 
target particular victims because of who they are and how they act. 
There is no question that an employee’s group membership factors 
into this calculus; this is unavoidable so long as marginalized traits are 
salient in our culture. But the critical point is that, by and large, the 
days of top-down discrimination are behind us.202 Modern 
discrimination is the product of a complex web of work-culture 
norms,203 stereotypes,204 and unconscious biases,205 which work 
together to make discrimination subtle, messy, and more personal 
than ever before.206 Discrimination is no longer just about who you 
are; it is also about how you express yourself and whether this self-
expression is welcome in your workplace. 
Central to Mary Anne Case’s view of Title VII’s antistereotyping 
principle is the idea that we should look to the margins as a guide for 
determining the substance of sex equality.207 When she was writing in 
the mid-1990s, the effeminate man resided at the margins of society.208 
 
 201. For a discussion of prescriptive stereotypes, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes 
and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 47–48 (2000). In addition to prescriptive 
stereotypes, Professor Appiah also identifies two other categories of stereotypes: false 
stereotypes (or prejudices) and descriptive (or statistical) stereotypes. Id. 
 202. See Sturm, supra note 19, at 465–68. 
 203. Green, supra note 19, passim.  
 204. See generally Meredith M. Render, Gender Rules, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133 
(2010). 
 205. See generally Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 
(2008). 
 206. Cf. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE: RETHINKING RACE IN 
“POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 1 (2013) (“Working Identity is constituted by a range of racially 
associated ways of being, including how one dresses, speaks, styles one’s hair; one’s professional 
and social affiliations; who one marries or dates; one’s politics and views about race; where one 
lives; and so on and so forth.”). 
 207. Case, supra note 176, at 105. 
 208. See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a claim brought by a 
man who charged that he was harassed because his coworkers presumed he was homosexual); 
Bedker v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting a 
discrimination claim brought by a man with long hair). Perhaps the best summary of the status 
of effeminate men in law and society, written right around the same time as Professor Case’s 
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Cultural norms have since shifted and the effeminate man, once a 
challenge for courts, is now an easy case.209 But he has been replaced 
at the margins by a cast of characters as diverse as they are 
stigmatized. Given its remedial nature, Title VII should steer toward 
the needs of these employees, the outsiders of today. This is where I 
disagree with Kimberly Yuracko’s vision of sex equality. She argues 
that Title VII should prohibit only discrimination “based on gender 
norms or scripts that inhibit the ability of individuals of a particular 
sex to participate successfully in the work world.”210 Under this view, 
Title VII would provide relief for Ann Hopkins, the abrasive business 
consultant,211 but not Peter Oiler, the man in a dress.212 Both violated 
conventional gender norms, but only Hopkins faced a norm that 
inhibits all or most women from flourishing in the workplace. “If 
employers were permitted to act upon the gender script equating 
aggressiveness in women with bitchiness,” Yuracko writes, “all 
women would be undermined in their ability to participate fully and 
successfully in the workplace.”213 Oiler, by contrast, violated a gender 
norm that affected, at most, a tiny population of men. “[E]radicating 
this particular gender norm is not necessary for the substantive [sex] 
equality of women and men in the work world,” she concludes.214 
Aside from biological attributes like being pregnant, we should 
be cautious about enshrining in law the idea that there are certain 
things that women do and certain things that men do. It may very well 
be that, as Yuracko points out, women who wear dresses conform to 
social norms while men who wear dresses buck them.215 But the 
question should not be whether a particular gender norm is harmful 
to all or most women (or men); it should be whether the norm harms 
an individual woman (or man). Cross-dressing is probably not 
important to most men and certainly not all men. But it was very 
 
work, is Professor Francisco Valdes’s classic article. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, 
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in 
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1995).  
 209. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009) (sanctioning 
a sex discrimination claim brought by an effeminate man); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 
F.3d 1061, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (same); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 
F.3d 864, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). 
 210. Yuracko, supra note 19, at 225.  
 211. Id. at 226–27. 
 212. Id. at 228–29. 
 213. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).  
 214. Id. at 228. 
 215. Id. at 225–26. 
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important to Peter Oiler’s sense of his identity, just as not wearing 
makeup was very important to Darlene Jespersen’s identity. Sex 
discrimination law should foster an ethic of self-definition; it should 
shield employees against gender norms that seek to dampen 
constitutive elements of an employee’s identity. After all, the 
universe of gender performances is vast, if not infinite, and one 
person’s femaleness (or maleness) is no more authentic than another 
person’s.216 
At this point, some may question whether sex discrimination law 
is capable of personalizing antidiscrimination protections in this way. 
How, for instance, will the law distinguish between norms that strike 
at constitutive elements of a person’s identity and other less harmful 
norms? I address these sorts of issues in greater detail in the following 
Part, in which I argue that we should remake sex discrimination law 
in the image of religious discrimination law. For now, however, the 
short answer is that it is up to each individual employee to determine 
the constitutive elements of her identity. The doctrinal structures of 
religious discrimination law—the very structures I want to import into 
sex discrimination law—facilitate this process of self-definition. In a 
religious discrimination case, the central question is not whether a 
particular trait or behavior is, from an objective standpoint, religious 
in nature. Instead, the inquiry is whether the employee, in her 
subjective capacity, believes the trait or behavior to be religious 
within her own worldview.217 Because each employee is given room to 
define the contours of her own religious beliefs and practices, 
religious discrimination law makes accommodation, rather than 
disparate treatment, the centerpiece of its analysis. In doing so, 
religious discrimination law accomplishes something that Title VII 
has otherwise been unable to do: define discrimination from the 
 
 216. A colleague jokingly referred to my argument as the “snowflake theory of sex 
equality.” Like snowflakes, no two women (or men) are the same, and sex discrimination law 
should foster these differences rather than squelch them. 
 217. In the early years of Title VII, the Supreme Court articulated a broad definition of 
religion. In a case involving conscientious objectors to military service, the Court concluded that 
a religious belief is “[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a 
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption.” 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). In a later case, the Court developed this 
definition further, concluding that Title VII also protects a moral or ethical belief, so long as it 
plays a role like religion in a person’s life. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1970). 
In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has construed religion 
broadly: “[T]he Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as 
to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious 
views.” 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2013). 
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perspective of the victim rather than the discriminator.218 Because an 
employee gets to determine what behaviors are central to her 
identity, the central task for the law is to determine whether the 
employer discriminated against the employee by not making 
accommodations for the employee’s behavior. 
C. Multiples 
One of the hallmarks of antidiscrimination analysis is the 
assumption that we can organize people into discrete categories.219 All 
people have a race or a sex, for instance, so the law sets out to 
categorize people along these lines. The problem, of course, is that 
modern discrimination is a messy enterprise that defies neat 
categorization. In its attempt to impose order on something 
disorderly, employment discrimination law neglects the needs of 
employees who face discrimination aimed at multiple parts of their 
identity. Writing in the late 1980s, Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw 
sparked a discussion about the problem of intersectionality in 
antidiscrimination law,220 which prompted scholars to develop a robust 
conception of identity for purposes of proving discrimination.221 Using 
discrimination against a black woman as her jumping off point, 
Crenshaw argued that the “intersectional experience is greater than 
 
 218. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1262–63 (noting that employment discrimination 
law does not, but should, address the way employees respond to discrimination). 
 219. This idea is, of course, textually based, as Title VII delineates certain traits as worthy of 
special protection against discrimination. In this regard, antidiscrimination law’s primary thrust 
is to categorize people to determine if they fit within the law’s protective umbrella. 
 220. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing] (“Because the 
intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does 
not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in 
which Black women are subordinated.”); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 
1244 (1991) (“[T]he intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black women’s lives in ways 
that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those 
experiences separately.”). 
 221. See generally, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701 (2001); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Intersectionality in Theory and 
Practice, in INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND: LAW, POWER AND THE POLITICS OF 
LOCATION 124 (Emily Grabham et al. eds., 2009); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Darren Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: 
“Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of 
Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2001); Nancy Levit, Theorizing the Connections 
Among Systems of Subordination, 71 UMKC L. REV. 227 (2002); Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My 
Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1991). 
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the sum of racism and sexism.”222 A black woman’s experience cannot 
be compared to the experience of either a black man or a white 
woman. Neither of these latter examples captures the full range of 
stereotypes and prejudices that attach uniquely to a black woman’s 
experience. 
Because it is stuck in what Crenshaw calls a “single-axis 
framework,”223 antidiscrimination law stumbles in the face of 
discrimination that cuts across multiple identity traits.224 Ultimately, 
this is a failure of group-based analysis. The dominant method of 
proving discrimination today is to consider how the employer treated 
the claimant as compared to a similarly situated employee.225 The 
closer the similarity, the easier it is to isolate the reason for the 
adverse employment action and, in turn, identify whether the 
employer was motivated by an illegitimate purpose.226 This is 
discrimination by algebraic equation: cancel out the traits in common, 
and the trait that motivated the employer’s action is left remaining.227 
Although helpful in theory, such analysis only works if the claimant 
has someone to compare herself to. 
Take Dawn Dawson as an example. Dawson worked as an 
assistant and stylist-in-training at Bumble & Bumble, a high-end salon 
 
 222. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 220, at 140. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Professor Marcia McCormick offers a helpful summary of how this dynamic works:  
[I]f a black woman is fired because of stereotypes of black women, she may be found 
not to have suffered any discrimination at all if those stereotypes differ from 
stereotypes of white women or of black men. In such a situation, a decision-maker 
would be likely to find that the woman was not discriminated against because of her 
race, because other members of her race (black men) did not suffer from application 
of the same stereotype. That decision-maker would also likely find that she was not 
discriminated against because of her sex, because other members of her sex (white 
women) did not suffer from application of the same stereotype. 
Marcia L. McCormick, Decoupling Employment, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 499, 519 (2012). 
 225. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 
(2011) (arguing against the use of comparators to assess discrimination cases). 
 226. The appeal of a comparator is so strong that courts have even made up hypothetical 
comparators as a means to test for discrimination. In Troupe v. May Department Stores Co., 20 
F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit considered a claim by a woman who alleged that 
she was fired after missing a significant chunk of work due to an unusually bad case of morning 
sickness. She charged that she was discriminated against because of her pregnancy, in violation 
of Title VII. In its consideration of her claim, the court invented “a hypothetical Mr. Troupe, 
who is as tardy as Ms. Troupe was, also because of health problems.” Id. at 738. The court went 
on to note that “[i]f Lord & Taylor would have fired our hypothetical Mr. Troupe, this implies 
that it fired Ms. Troupe not because she was pregnant but because she cost the company more 
than she was worth to it.” Id.  
 227. Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc. 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Lex K. Larson, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 40.04 (2d ed. 1996)). 
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in New York City.228 A self-described gender-nonconforming lesbian 
woman,229 Dawson was fired from her assistant position and kicked 
out of the stylist training program.230 The salon’s reason for these 
actions was that Dawson had little chance of finding a stylist position 
except in New York City because her demeanor and appearance 
would frighten most people.231 On top of that, Dawson also alleged 
that several of her coworkers harassed her on a regular basis, 
subjecting her to a steady stream of demeaning comments, often in 
front in clients.232 For instance, they called her “Donald.”233 They said 
she should act less like a man and more like a woman.234 They said she 
wore her sexuality “like a costume.”235 And they said she “needed to 
have sex with a man.”236 Dawson responded by bringing a sex 
discrimination claim under Title VII, which she lost handily.237 
As Dawson’s case demonstrates, intersectionality is a conceptual 
blind spot for antidiscrimination law.238 In the eyes of the court, 
Dawson was first and foremost a lesbian.239 That Dawson was also a 
masculine woman, and that she faced discrimination both as a 
masculine woman and as a lesbian, did not factor into the court’s 
thinking. In this sense, Dawson’s case confirms Professor Crenshaw’s 
central insight into the limits of existing antidiscrimination discourse: 
an employee cannot inhabit more than one identity at a time. Because 
it saw her as a lesbian—and as nothing but a lesbian—the court 
viewed Dawson’s sex discrimination claim as an attempt to bootstrap 
 
 228. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 214. 
 231. Id. at 215–16. 
 232. Id. at 215. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 216. 
 237. Id. at 213, 225. 
 238. A notable exception is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 
F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994), which involved a law professor who sued her university, alleging that 
she was denied a position as the director of the school’s Pacific Asian Legal Studies Program 
because she is an Asian-American woman. Id. at 1554. In that case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that “where two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct 
components.” Id. at 1562. From there, the court determined that, when a case turns on multiple 
traits, a fact finder must consider the “combination of factors” wrapped up in a person’s 
identity. Id.  
 239. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 217–20. 
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protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.240 Though Bumble & 
Bumble employed outsiders of various stripes,241 there was no one 
who could serve as a comparator for Dawson. And without a 
comparator in sight, the court was able to recast Dawson’s claim, 
transforming it from a hard case about gender norms into an easy 
case about sexual orientation. 
Taking a step back, intersectionality theory highlights an 
important point about the regulatory force of employment 
discrimination law. By channeling discrimination claims into a single-
axis framework, employment discrimination doctrine effectively 
shapes an employee’s identity. We see this in Dawn Dawson’s case, as 
the doctrine marked her as a lesbian and, in the process, erased any 
sense of her female masculinity. We see it in the transgender 
discrimination cases, as the doctrine forces a male-to-female 
transsexual to self-identify as a man in a dress and thereby give up her 
hard-fought female identity. And we see it in discrimination against a 
black woman—the paradigm case of intersectionality—as the law pits 
her blackness and femaleness against each other, forcing her to claim 
one identity and forego the other. As a regulatory force, employment 
discrimination law tends to mute difference. The time has come for a 
new sex discrimination regime, one that amplifies difference rather 
than dampens it. The next Part sets out to imagine just such a regime. 
III.  THE NEW SEX DISCRIMINATION 
In this Part, I sketch a new framework for sex discrimination law 
that is modeled on the protections currently available to employees in 
religious discrimination cases. The defining characteristic of religious 
discrimination law is its elasticity. Through various doctrinal 
mechanisms, the law bends to the needs of employees, seeking to 
empower employees to practice their faith without having to sacrifice 
their position at work. I want to be clear at the outset, however, that I 
am not proposing this shift because I think it will automatically 
translate into more victories for employees in sex discrimination 
cases. Rather, I propose it because religious discrimination law offers 
a more sophisticated way of thinking about difference and 
discrimination. 
 
 240. Id. at 218–20. 
 241. Id. at 214. 
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The prevailing discourse in religious discrimination law is built 
around twin goals of neutrality and balance. The law takes a neutral 
position on what counts as religious in belief and practice, thereby 
giving employees plenty of room to determine for themselves what is 
or is not required as part of their faith.242 At the same time, the law 
seeks to strike a balance between an employer’s needs in organizing 
its workplace and an employee’s needs in furtherance of her faith. On 
this latter point, employers clearly have the upper hand. In an at-will 
environment,243 antidiscrimination protections can only go so far, and 
the law reaches its limit once an employer offers a reasonable 
accommodation or shows that no such accommodation is possible. 
Yet the inquiry is what really matters. The ultimate question in a 
religious discrimination case is whether an employer can adapt its 
workplace to the needs of its employee and not the other way around. 
Sex discrimination should follow suit. By reorganizing sex 
discrimination law in this way, we can advance the needs of men and 
women at the margins of our society while at the same time advancing 
the work of antidiscrimination law more generally. This, in turn, 
would bring us closer to the ideal of a workplace culture in which 
employers make decisions on the basis of merit rather than identity. 
I develop this argument in three sections. The first articulates a 
doctrinal shift for sex discrimination, tracking the doctrinal 
framework currently used in religious discrimination cases. The next 
Section argues for a new vision of equality for sex discrimination law, 
one that is steeped in difference rather than sameness. Finally, the 
last Section sharpens my argument by responding to potential 
critiques. 
A. A New Framework 
To begin, consider a garden-variety example of religious 
discrimination. Abercrombie & Fitch hired Lakettra Bennett to work 
 
 242. See, e.g., Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2001). In 
Anderson, the employee determined on her own that communicating “Have a Blessed Day” 
when ending a conversation or written communication was an important part of her faith; 
religious discrimination law does not question that determination. Id. 
 243. American employment follows an at-will rule, meaning that either an employer or an 
employee can end an employment contract for any reason, or for no reason at all. Perhaps the 
first American court to adopt the at-will rule was Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad, 81 
Tenn. 507 (1884), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court held that employers “may dismiss 
their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause 
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.” Id. at 519–20. Antidiscrimination 
statutes like Title VII operate as a limitation on the at-will rule. 
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as a sales person—or, as Abercrombie & Fitch calls it, “model”—in 
one of its stores.244 Soon after that she was promoted to a manager-in-
training position and transferred to one of the company’s Hollister 
stores.245 At the time, Bennett followed the company’s “Look Policy,” 
which required employees to wear clothes that were consistent with 
the Hollister brand, namely, “ripped-up jeans, a little revealing, 
sporty, California beach style, laid back.”246 Female employees in 
particular were supposed to make themselves look sexy by wearing 
tight clothing that accentuated their bodies.247 
The Hollister dress code soon became a problem for Bennett. 
After converting to the Apostolic religion, Bennett wanted to dress 
more modestly. She exchanged her short skirts for long skirts that fell 
below the knee, her low cut shirts for long sleeve shirts that did not 
show any cleavage.248 On her first day back to work after her 
conversion, she wore an ankle-length denim skirt, which was unlike 
anything Hollister had ever sold.249 Her new attire clearly violated 
Hollister policy, though the company was willing to work with her. 
Over the course of several meetings, the company offered a number 
of alternatives to resolve the conflict between Hollister’s dress code 
and Bennett’s clothing preferences. One option was to wear jeans 
instead of skirts.250 Another was to wear short skirts with leggings 
underneath to cover her legs.251 The final option was to look in other 
stores for skirts that would be consistent with both the dress code and 
her religious beliefs.252 
Bennett rejected all three proposals.253 The only accommodation 
she was willing to settle for was an exception to the company’s dress 
 
 244. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie & Fitch I), No. 4:08CV1470 
JCH, 2009 WL 3517578, *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie & Fitch II), No. 4:08CV1470 
JCH, 2009 WL 3517584, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009) (further describing the brand’s style as 
“sexy, form-fitting, and designed to show off body contours and draw attention to the wearer”); 
id. (“Bennett described the length of skirts and dresses sold by Hollister during the relevant 
time frame as falling just below the buttocks.”). 
 248. Id.  
 249. Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine at 2, 
Abercrombie & Fitch I, 2009 WL 351578 (No. 4:08CV1470 JCH), 2009 WL 4900167. 
 250. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, 
Abercrombie & Fitch I, 2009 WL 351578 (No. 4:08CV1470 JCH), 2009 WL 2565188. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 5–6. 
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code so that she could wear long skirts.254 Unwilling to make this 
concession, Hollister gave Bennett two weeks to make a decision: 
adhere to the policy or resign.255 She opted to resign.256 Soon afterward 
she brought a religious discrimination claim under Title VII, alleging 
that Hollister made no effort to reasonably accommodate her 
religious practice.257 
The first step in evaluating a claim of religious discrimination is 
to determine whether an employee’s beliefs constitute a “bona fide” 
religious belief under Title VII.258 This is a notably relaxed standard. 
There is no list of permitted religions. Nor is there any expectation 
that an employee’s beliefs be in the mainstream of her faith. Instead, 
the court considers whether the belief is religious within the given 
employee’s worldview.259 Piercings have been held to be religious 
under this standard,260 as have tattoos,261 veganism,262 witchcraft,263 and 
even atheism.264 In addition, an employee must show that the religious 
belief is sincerely held.265 It was the sincerity requirement that may 
have posed the biggest problem for Lakettra Bennett in her suit 
against Abercrombie & Fitch. Although she claimed that her faith did 
not permit form-fitting clothing, she showed up to her deposition 
wearing a tight shirt, which she herself described as “body 
conscious.”266 The purpose of the sincerity requirement is to make 
 
 254. Id. at 7. 
 255. Plaintiff’s Trial Brief at 2, Abercrombie & Fitch I, 2009 WL 351578 (No. 4:08CV1470 
JCH), 2009 WL 4900158. 
 256. Abercrombie & Fitch I, 2009 WL 351578, at *1. 
 257. Id.  
 258. See id. at *2 (“In order to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under 
Title VII, Plaintiff must show that Bennett had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with 
an employment requirement . . . .”). 
 259. See supra note 217. 
 260. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 129, 134–37 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 261. EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., No. C04-1291JLR, 2005 WL 2090677, at 
*5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005). 
 262. Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL 
6721098, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2012). 
 263. Dettmer v. London, 799 F.2d 929, 934 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 264. Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 265. See EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados 
de P.R., 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate both that the belief or 
practice is religious and that it is sincerely held.”).  
 266. See Lawrence E. Dubé, Court Sends Religious Bias Case to Trial; Employee Quit Over 
Retailer’s “Look Policy,” Daily Lab. Rep., No. 211, at A-5 (Nov. 4, 2009). A helpful source for 
me on the Bennett case, as well as the Dubé piece just cited, was DIANE AVERY, MARIA L. 
ONTIVEROS, ROBERT L. CORRADA, MICHAEL L. SELMI & MELISSA HART, EMPLOYMENT 
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sure that employees do not disingenuously appeal to religion so they 
can avoid work obligations.267 In one particularly memorable case, a 
plaintiff was unable to convince the court that his practice of eating 
Kozy Kitten Cat Food was a sincerely held religious belief.268 
Once an employee satisfies these definitional requirements—and 
it is worth noting that, contrary to the cat-food eater, most employees 
do in fact satisfy these requirements—the next step in the framework 
is to look at an employer’s response to the conflict.269 The bulk of 
religious discrimination litigation focuses on this step. Title VII 
imposes on employers a duty to make reasonable accommodations 
for an employee’s religious beliefs or practices. An employer is not 
bound to accept an employee’s requested accommodation.270 Nor is 
the obligation limitless. An employer does not have to make an 
accommodation if doing so would pose an “undue hardship.”271 In an 
important case, the Supreme Court defined undue hardship as a 
requested accommodation that would make an employer “bear more 
than a de minimis cost.”272 This standard is a boon for employers, and 
it also helps reign in the reasonable accommodation theory, which has 
the potential to cripple business if left unrestrained. 
Lakettra Bennett’s case highlights the important role that 
negotiation plays in reasonable accommodation. Rather than 
rejecting her requests out of hand, the company offered Bennett 
three different options to accommodate her faith. This is a hallmark 
of reasonable accommodation; it facilitates an interactive process 
between employer and employee, who must work together to try to 
fix the problem in such a way that the employee can get back to work 
and the employer’s business will not suffer too much on account of 
 
DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 641–45 
(8th ed. 2010).  
 267. See Reed, 330 F.3d at 935 (“[A]n employee is not permitted to redefine a purely 
personal preference or aversion as a religious belief. Otherwise he could announce without 
warning that white walls or venetian blinds offended his ‘spirituality,’ and the employer would 
have to scramble to see whether it was feasible to accommodate him by repainting the walls or 
substituting curtains for venetian blinds.” (citations omitted)). 
 268. See Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
 269. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie & Fitch II), No. 
4:08CV1470 JCH, 2009 WL 3517584, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009). 
 270. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986). 
 271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006). 
 272. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
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the changes.273 In this regard, reasonable accommodation upends 
traditional antidiscrimination discourse, and in a good way. It 
transforms the employment relationship into a kind of partnership. 
Not an equal partnership, to be sure, but these partnerships make it 
possible for employers and employees to have an honest conversation 
about difference—which differences matter, why they matter, and 
whether there is space in the workplace for these differences.274 A 
workplace brimming with these sorts of conversations is a breeding 
ground for real social change, the kind of change that is felt beyond 
the walls of the workplace.275 
1. Sex as Practice.  The first step in my proposal is that sex 
discrimination law track the causation standard currently in use in 
religion cases. This would shift the analysis away from the 
conventional “because of sex” standard that dominates sex 
discrimination law today and move it more toward an individualistic 
standard that focuses on the employee’s lived experience of 
discrimination. For this to work, sex discrimination law will have to 
embrace the idea that sex is both a status and a practice. Employees 
face sex discrimination both because of who they are (status) and 
because of how they act (practice). The new sex discrimination is all 
about sex as a practice, capturing the performative side of a person’s 
identity. The critical question will be one of self-definition: Does the 
employee sincerely believe that the practice in question is constitutive 
of her identity as a woman (or his identity as a man)? 
Consider two examples. Start with Darlene Jespersen and 
Harrah’s no-makeup policy.276 For Jespersen, wearing makeup 
conflicted with her own sense of her womanhood. She found it 
 
 273. Under the ADA—which serves as the model for Title VII’s reasonable-
accommodation mandate—the “interactive process” is an important step in the reasonable-
accommodation analysis. See supra note 67. The “interactive process” does not grow out of the 
text of the ADA, but from an EEOC guideline on the statute. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) 
(2013). 
 274. See KIRKLAND, supra note 75, at 136–40. 
 275. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKFORCE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003). Professor Estlund identifies the workplace as 
uniquely situated to foster interconnectedness among a diverse citizenry, especially now that the 
importance of community and civic ties are dwindling in our culture. Specifically, that work 
necessitates involuntary work relationships—relationships born of necessity rather than 
choice—provides people an opportunity to learn from each other and, hopefully, bridge some of 
the divides that separate different groups in their private lives. Put simply, conversations and 
interactions at work have the potential to change the way people live their lives.  
 276. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
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degrading, so much so that she could not do her job—a job she had 
done exceedingly well for over twenty years—effectively. And she 
sincerely felt this way. It was not the case that Jespersen immediately 
developed her preference when the company announced its new 
policy; she had not worn makeup at any time in her many years with 
the company, nor did she wear makeup outside work. Her stance 
against makeup was a deeply held conviction. 
Now consider Krystal Etsitty, the transgender city bus driver 
who was fired for using women’s restrooms along her route.277 The 
critical question in the case would be to determine Etsitty’s sex. 
Existing law defines Etsitty’s sex according to her birth sex, which was 
male. This explains why Etsitty had to resort to a theory of sex 
discrimination that defined her not as a woman but as a man who 
faced discrimination because he wanted to wear a dress. By contrast, 
my proposal allows Etsitty to define her sex consistent with her 
transition, thereby allowing her to be a female. The sex practice in 
question was Etsitty’s use of a women’s restroom. She would have to 
argue—and I am confident she could establish—that using a women’s 
restroom was constitutive of her identity as a woman. And such a 
belief would, no doubt, be about as sincere as they come. 
2. Accommodating Sex.  The first step is the easy part. The 
second step—determining whether the employer must accommodate 
the sex practice—is, as it should be, a harder question. To avail 
oneself of the reasonable accommodation protections, an employee 
would have to engage her employer, alerting the employer to the 
conflict—if the employer were not already aware of it—and opening a 
line of communication to try to remedy the situation. An employer’s 
duty to accommodate would not mean that an employer has to accept 
any proposal put forth by one of its employees; the standard would be 
one of reasonableness. If an employer offers a reasonable solution, an 
employee could not reject it in favor of her own preferred solution 
and still state a claim under Title VII. And if no accommodation were 
possible, I would likewise adopt the undue-hardship safety valve. A 
surprisingly low standard, the undue-hardship test is far more 
favorable to an employer’s interests than an employee’s. 
Two more points bear mentioning before considering some 
examples. The first is that reasonable accommodation is a fact-
intensive inquiry, which makes sense given that reasonable 
 
 277. See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text. 
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accommodation seeks to craft individualized remedies. As such, every 
case of reasonable accommodation is tailored to the needs of the 
employee alleging discrimination. The second point is more of a 
reminder: the real value of reasonable accommodation is that it 
facilitates a conversation between employers and employees about 
difference. 
Now return to Darlene Jespersen’s case. Jespersen wanted an 
exception to Harrah’s makeup policy. Harrah’s, by contrast, sought 
uniformity; it was trying to foster an image in its casinos, and makeup 
was an important part of that image. Jespersen’s history with the 
company undercuts the argument that female bartenders needed to 
wear makeup to do their job well. Although Harrah’s had long 
encouraged women to wear makeup,278 Jespersen never did. And her 
work performance did not suffer because of it. It is simply hard to 
argue that her job now calls for wearing makeup. Under a reasonable 
accommodation standard, Harrah’s would have to identify the costs 
of honoring Jespersen’s request, as a means of arguing that 
accommodating Jespersen would amount to an undue hardship. This 
would be an uphill battle. 
Krystal Etsitty’s case would be harder. The employer never 
inquired whether certain businesses along her route would have 
allowed Etsitty to use their bathrooms,279 though it is not clear that the 
employer would have been required to look into this possibility. If 
that were possible, however, that might have satisfied everyone’s 
wishes. Another possibility is that Etsitty could have waited to use the 
bathroom until after completing her route, possibly until she returned 
to the bus station. If that worked, Etsitty would have had to bear the 
brunt of the costs, as she would have had to wait to go the bathroom 
until she finished her shift. Yet it is also possible that there are no 
good solutions here. Let me stress that my proposal does not mean 
that every claimant has to be accommodated. My hope is that Etsitty 
and her employer would be able to work things out without having to 
resort to litigation. Having an accommodation framework in place 
incentivizes these sorts of negotiations, making litigation a last resort 
when compromise is not possible. 
 
 278. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 279. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007).  
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B. A New Vision of Equality 
The backbone of the new sex discrimination regime is the idea 
that difference is universal. In his new book Far From the Tree, 
Andrew Solomon makes this point better than I can.280 Solomon is 
writing in the context of parents who have children with different 
identities than their own—straight parents who have a gay child, able-
bodied parents who have a disabled child, and parents of average 
intelligence who have a prodigy, to name a few examples.281 Yet his 
claim is no less applicable to my project: “Difference unites us. While 
each of these experiences can isolate those who are affected, together 
they compose an aggregate of millions whose struggles connect them 
profoundly. The exceptional is ubiquitous; to be entirely typical is the 
rare and lonely state.”282 What Solomon has identified—and it is a 
point I want to stress—is that each person’s search for identity is hers 
alone. And this search does not get put on hold when an employee 
enters the workplace. The idea that our work and private lives occupy 
separate spheres is more metaphor than reality. Employees bring into 
the workplace their preferences and biases, their relationships and 
associations, their identities and senses of self.283 The workplace is an 
artificial environment, assembling an increasingly diverse set of 
individuals who would otherwise not interact with each other in their 
daily lives.284 If anything, work magnifies the social pressures facing 
outsider employees, making it all the more important for outsiders to 
fit in among their coworkers.285 
For the new sex discrimination regime to take hold, we need to 
recalibrate the vision of equality that undergirds sex discrimination 
law. Put simply, we need to start thinking about equality in terms of 
cultivating difference among employees. A helpful way to facilitate 
this shift would be to expand the way we talk about Title VII’s 
protections. Title VII lists prohibited bases for employment—race, 
sex, religion, among others. I have made the conscious choice 
throughout this Article to refer to these as “protected traits” rather 
 
 280. ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE SEARCH 
FOR IDENTITY (2012). 
 281. See generally id.  
 282. Id. at 4. 
 283. See Zachary A. Kramer, After Work, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 628 (2007).  
 284. See ESTLUND, supra note  275, at 4.  
 285. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1269 (discussing the lengths to which outsiders 
must go to fit in at work). 
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than “protected groups.” In my experience, the latter formulation is 
far more prevalent than my rendering.286 Though it may seem like a 
minor matter of semantics, the difference between these two 
formulations is actually quite meaningful, cutting to the heart of what 
is at stake in employment discrimination law. When we couch Title 
VII in the language of groups, we not only anchor the statute to the 
needs of groups, but we also marginalize those employees who do not 
fit neatly into recognized identity groups, whether because of the 
complexity of their identity—think intersectionality—or because they 
are the outsiders among other outsiders, the employees who have the 
hardest time fitting in. My position is that sex discrimination law 
needs to make a better effort to reach these employees. 
I am not arguing that we should completely abandon the 
sameness model. What we need is a holistic vision of equality, one 
that is capable of pivoting between sameness and difference as the 
case calls for it. Group-based discrimination still occurs. Take the 
recent Wal-Mart litigation.287 The plaintiffs in that case charged, 
among other things, that Wal-Mart discriminated against women as a 
group in its promotion decisions.288 Contrast their claims with Darlene 
Jespersen’s, Ann Hopkins’s, and Karen Ulane’s claims. These latter 
cases are all about particular women who sought a personalized 
remedy. Whereas the women of Wal-Mart wanted to be treated the 
same as men, Jespersen, Hopkins, and Ulane wanted to be treated 
differently than all their coworkers, men and women alike, because 
they had different needs than their coworkers. Each practiced her 
womanhood on her own terms—as a woman who refuses to wear 
makeup, as a woman who curses and acts aggressively, and as a 
woman who used to be a man. Their search for identity has carried 
them beyond the bounds of what our culture currently deems 
appropriate for women, and they suffered the consequences at work 
because of it. Equality is a remarkably pliable concept. In its 
prevailing form it works to constrain identity, discouraging 
marginalized employees from embracing the full range of their 
identities. Yet it also has the capacity to liberate identity, providing a 
blank canvas on which employees can sketch their own concept of 
 
 286. So engrained in our thinking about discrimination, the comparator heuristic is a part of 
the prima facie case for proving discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (noting that an employee must prove that she “belongs to a racial minority” 
to make a prima facie case for Title VII discrimination); supra note 226. 
 287. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 288. Id. at 2547. 
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who they are. It is possible for sex discrimination law to speak of 
equality and difference in the same breath as part of a common 
project. My hope is that sex discrimination law will move in that 
direction. 
C. Concerns 
My argument is sure to have raised red flags along the way. In 
this Section, I respond to three major objections, all of which I have 
faced at one point or another as I have explored this project. 
1. Groups Matter.  The first objection is that my argument has 
overlooked the value of group membership, especially in the realm of 
civil-rights practice. People benefit immensely from joining and 
identifying as a member of a group. Members of a group share a 
common history. For many outsiders, the first step in asserting a new 
identity is to walk the path of those who came before them. The 
promise of group membership is a community based on shared 
experience. It makes no difference where you are or where you have 
been, even if you are the only person around who has your identity. 
You can always identify with others like you. This is what makes Dan 
Savage’s “It Gets Better Project” so powerful.289 Savage, an influential 
sex-advice columnist, sought to create a vehicle to reach gay youth 
who are victims of bullying.290 The immediate goal of the project was 
to urge gay kids not to commit suicide in the face of harassment and 
social ostracism. The broader aim, however, is to reassure these kids, 
many of whom have no gay role models in their day-to-day lives, that 
they are already part of a larger community of people just like them.291 
Groups matter. I would not want to suggest otherwise. My 
critique of sex discrimination law is that it has lost sight of the 
individual at a time when the individual is more important than ever. 
This is not to say that sex discrimination can or should stop thinking 
about groups. That is why I am envisioning a two-tiered sex 
discrimination regime. The first tier is sex discrimination as we have 
always known it, taking aim at discrimination for being male or 
female. Such status discrimination cases revolve around an 
 
 289. See IT GETS BETTER PROJECT, http://www.itgetsbetter.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
 290. What Is the It Gets Better Project?, IT GETS BETTER PROJECT, http://www.itgetsbetter.
org/pages/about-it-gets-better-project (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).  
 291. See id. (describing the purpose of the website as providing a forum for communication 
with the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community).   
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employee’s group membership. The second tier is focused on 
individualized harms. These are the cases in which the employee faces 
discrimination not because of who she (or he) is, but because of how 
she (or he) acts in the workplace. Whereas the first tier is concerned 
with being, the second tier is concerned with doing. The reforms I 
have presented would apply only to the second tier of cases. The 
purpose of the new sex discrimination is to supplement the old sex 
discrimination, not to replace it. Together, they will work in concert 
to strike at the full spectrum of sex discrimination as it exists today. 
2. Flood and Stretch.  The next major concern is that my proposal 
broadens the concept of sex discrimination far beyond anything we 
have seen before in American law. Consider a hypothetical to 
sharpen the critique.292 Say that an employee wants to be excused 
from work two days a week so he can practice karate. When the 
employer resists—as the employer most certainly would—the 
employee demands an accommodation because his karate practice is 
an essential part of his manhood. How is it that we can still call this 
sex discrimination? There are traits that, even if you do not think 
should be protected, are clearly linked to sex in some way—refusing 
to wear makeup, cross-dressing, and transitioning from one sex to 
another are prime examples. But practicing karate is something else 
entirely. If the employee gets to define what practices are constitutive 
of identity, then the employee has a lot of room—arguably too much 
room—to determine the substance of sex discrimination law. 
There are two ways of thinking about this objection—flood and 
stretch. Let me start with flood. The argument is that my proposal will 
lead to a deluge of sex discrimination cases, which will drain resources 
that would be better spent on other, more serious forms of 
discrimination.293 For instance, one may argue that neither being 
forced to wear makeup nor being denied time to practice karate can 
compare to a case in which an employer discriminates on the basis of 
race. Though I am sympathetic to this concern, I am uncomfortable 
with any conception of workplace equality that subscribes to a strict 
hierarchy of harms. Title VII is not like the Equal Protection Clause; 
there are no levels of scrutiny, no differing standards depending on 
 
 292. Thanks to David DePianto for the following hypothetical. 
 293. See generally William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?: An Empirical 
Assessment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (2001) (outlining this concern in the context of sexual-
orientation discrimination law).  
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the trait at issue. Although others might see makeup as a relatively 
minor matter, it was not to Jespersen, and that is what matters most 
to the vision of sex equality I have put forth in this Article. Moreover, 
the flood concern assumes that a more lenient standard automatically 
leads to more litigation. The time, money, and inconvenience of 
litigating, not to mention how it disrupts their employment 
relationship, will dissuade most people from wasting the effort of 
bringing a sex discrimination case. Only those who feel strongly about 
the employer’s decision will resort to litigation. So if the employee 
truly believes that his manhood is tied up in his karate practice, then 
sex discrimination law should care about it, even if it ultimately 
cannot provide the man with a remedy. 
As for stretch, the argument is that if anything and everything 
counts as sex, then there is no limit on sex discrimination. I want to 
respond in two ways. The first is to emphasize that there is a limiting 
principle built into my proposal. Just like in a religious discrimination 
case, an employment decision would be sex based provided two 
conditions are met. First, the identity trait in question must be sex 
based within the employee’s worldview. This may seem far too open-
ended, but it will work for the same reason it already works in 
religious discrimination cases: individuals are in the best position to 
define the terms of their own identity. Second, the employee’s belief 
that the trait under attack is sex based must be sincerely held. As is 
the case with religious discrimination, the purpose of the sincerity 
requirement is to safeguard against employees using sex 
discrimination as an excuse to avoid work obligations. 
The second point in response to the stretch argument is that we 
should not think of antidiscrimination law only as a means to right 
wrongs. In addition to remedying specific cases of discrimination, 
antidiscrimination law also facilitates a critical conversation about 
identity and difference—a conversation that takes place in 
workplaces, in courts, in the media, and in people’s daily lives. 
Although he ultimately leans away from the law as a tool for civil 
rights,294 Kenji Yoshino celebrates the virtues of a “reason-forcing 
conversation,” a conversation in which those who seek to impose a 
burden on an outsider must justify their reason for doing so.295 As 
 
 294. YOSHINO, supra note 31, at 194–95.  
 295. Id. at 178 (emphasis omitted). 
KRAMER IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2013  9:26 AM 
948 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:891 
Yoshino writes, these conversations “reveal the true dimension of 
civil rights.”296 
Stretch is not a bad thing. Outside of biological differences, sex 
does not have natural boundaries. The problem with existing sex 
discrimination doctrine is that it tries to draw firm lines around sex. 
By contrast, my proposal takes a hands-off approach, leaving it up to 
the individual to set the boundaries for what constitutes sex. None of 
us is in a good position to tell the man that practicing karate is not 
essential to his manhood; it is something only he can decide for 
himself. What the law can do, however, is facilitate a conversation 
between the man and his employer, in the hope that they can come to 
some resolution of the situation. In this case, the requested 
accommodation seems unlikely. I do not expect that any court would 
second-guess the employer’s decision not to let the man take off work 
to practice karate. But that is beside the point I want to make here. 
The conversation is what matters. At every turn, my proposal points 
toward conversation as an important means of bringing about social 
change. It gives the employee an outlet to express his identity. It lets 
employers explain what they need from their employees to maintain 
good order in the workplace. And, most important of all, it harnesses 
the power to change people’s minds about difference. 
3. Religion Is Special.  Religion holds a special status in our legal 
culture. Under the First Amendment, the state can neither prefer nor 
inhibit religious practice.297 Religion receives this special status 
because of the critical role that religious freedom played in the 
founding of our country. Yet this special status also stems from the 
fact that we tend to think of religion as being somehow different than 
the other traits protected by antidiscrimination law. This helps to 
explain the so-called “ministerial exception” to Title VII, a judicially 
created rule that allows religious institutions to engage in overt 
discrimination for positions related to the institution’s religious 
mission.298 And it also helps to explain why claimants in religious 
discrimination cases have access to a separate antidiscrimination 
regime than claimants alleging other forms of discrimination. Thus it 
 
 296. Id. at 195. 
 297. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 298. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 
(2012) (upholding an exception to antidiscrimination laws that applies when religious 
institutions hire employees). 
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is only fair to question whether sex discrimination likewise deserves 
accommodation. 
This is an important objection, raising a roadblock to my 
proposal that is both legal and ideological in nature. Let me start with 
a concession: I cannot overcome the point that religion deserves 
special treatment for historical reasons. Employment discrimination 
law is structured so as to give employees a reasonable amount of 
space to practice their faith, space that it is not available to employees 
to explore other aspects of their identity. Set aside the historical and 
textual reasons for treating religious discrimination differently. Are 
there other reasons to explain why religion is different than sex (or 
any other protected trait under Title VII)? 
The obvious point to consider is that religion is mutable and the 
other traits are immutable. The theory here is that religion requires 
special treatment because it is not a fixed identity like a race or sex. It 
comes down to a person’s control over her identity. If a person can 
change her religion—or even abandon religion altogether—then the 
person has a greater say in who she is and how she lives her life. We 
do not, by contrast, get to choose our race, race being biologically 
determined. Sex is another story, though. Although the vast majority 
of people do not exercise choice over their sex, some people do, going 
to great lengths to change their birth sex. Indeed, the great lesson of 
the transgender cases is that, where there is a will, there is a way to 
change one’s sex. At least as far as immutability is concerned, religion 
and sex are more alike than different. 
Maybe we need a softer definition of immutability. Rather than 
thinking of traits as locked identities, we can define immutability as a 
trait that is so central to our sense of self that it would be extremely 
difficult to change. We see this view of immutability used in asylum 
law, in which courts have ruled, for instance, that sexuality and 
gender identity “are immutable; they are so fundamental to one’s 
identity that a person should not be required to abandon them.”299 
Under this view, immutability is more about the effect of changing 
one’s identity rather than the ability to change it. Yet this new 
definition would not resolve the problem at hand. Once again, the 
transgender example suggests that changeability is not a useful 
dividing line. Converting one’s sex is no less fraught than converting 
one’s religion; that a person wants to change his or her sex, and is 
 
 299. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other 
grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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willing to spend the time, money, and emotional energy to do so, says 
a lot about how important the change is to the person’s sense of self. 
We could say the same about converting from gay to straight, forcing 
oneself not to cross-dress, or wearing makeup even though it makes 
one’s skin crawl. Forcing or expecting people to change traits that are 
constitutive of their identity is like asking them to be somebody 
else.300 In this regard, religion is not all that different than any other 
important identity trait that is capable of change. 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
Before concluding, I want to take a step back to consider some of 
the broader implications of my argument. My goal in this Part is to lay 
the groundwork for future discussions. To that end, I raise two 
questions about the future of employment discrimination law in light 
of my proposals for sex discrimination law. Because these questions 
provoke ideas that are each capable of sustaining an article unto 
itself, I simply cannot answer them in this space. Yet they are worth 
considering, if fleetingly, in the hope that they will stimulate future 
conversation about how antidiscrimination law should adapt to the 
changing nature of employment discrimination. 
A. Beyond Sex 
Sex discrimination is only a small sliver of employment 
discrimination law. What about the other traits protected by Title 
VII? Surely one could make a parallel argument about, say, race.301 
Like sex, race is both a status and a practice, a marker of both who an 
employee is and how the employee presents herself in the workplace. 
And like sex discrimination, modern race discrimination is primarily 
about the performative aspects of a person’s racial identity. Consider 
a prominent case.302 American Airlines refused to allow Renee 
Rogers, an African-American woman, to wear her hair in cornrows.303 
Rogers argued that the all-braided hairstyle held a special significance 
 
 300. This is reminiscent of Tobias Wolff’s critique of the military’s now-defunct “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” policy, which required lesbian and gay service members to present themselves as 
heterosexual. See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and 
the U.S. Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141 (1997).  
 301. National origin is another good example, particularly with respect to English-only 
policies in workplace. For useful discussion of the language discrimination cases, see generally 
Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1689 (2006). 
 302. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 303. Id. at 231. 
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for her as a black woman in America.304 It was, in other words, critical 
to her sense of her own racial identity. 
Rogers ultimately lost her case, with the court drawing a 
distinction between a natural hairstyle (such as an Afro) and one 
based on artifice.305 Braids were of the latter variety, according to the 
court, and therefore beyond the reach of Title VII.306 Scholars have 
written strong critiques of the court’s decision.307 My interest in the 
case lies elsewhere. Later on in its opinion, the court notes that 
American Airlines would have allowed Rogers to put her hair in a 
bun and wrap a hairpiece around the bun.308 After trying it out, 
though, Rogers rejected this option because the hairpiece gave her 
severe headaches.309 The court does not frame the inquiry this way, 
but this is textbook accommodation analysis. The employer had a rule 
that prevented Rogers from wearing her hair in a manner that was 
critical to her sense of self as a black woman. The employer proposed 
a solution to the conflict—wearing her braids in a bun and hairpiece. 
It is hard to say whether the proposed accommodation was 
reasonable, but that is something that could be addressed through 
litigation. 
Renee Rogers’s case further demonstrates that accommodation 
is a natural way of thinking about identity and difference in the 
workplace. Moreover, it also suggests that existing conceptions of 
racial identity—like existing conceptions of sex and gender—do not 
capture the full range of how employees perform their identity in the 
workplace. Thus, as we look to the future of employment 
discrimination law, we need to consider whether other kinds of 
discrimination—race, national origin, and age, among others—should 
likewise move toward the antidiscrimination model I have proposed 
for sex discrimination. 
 
 304. Id. at 231–32. 
 305. Id. at 232. 
 306. Id. 
 307. See, e.g., D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair . . . in the 
Workplace, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405, 412–14 (2011); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another 
Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1090–93 
(2010). See generally Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race 
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365. 
 308. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 309. Id. 
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B. Beyond Title VII 
There is a growing sense among scholars that Title VII may not 
be up to the task of eradicating employment discrimination as it exists 
today. Suzanne Goldberg writes that employment discrimination law 
“is in the midst of a crisis.”310 Elizabeth Glazer argues that 
employment discrimination law “needs help.”311 Marcia McCormick 
notes that employment discrimination law has effectively stalled, 
accomplishing little since the 1980s.312 And Nancy Levit has shown 
that employment discrimination law is on the wrong side of changing 
workforce demographics.313 I am likewise concerned that Title VII is 
ill-equipped to face the challenges raised by modern discrimination. 
The reforms I have proposed in this Article only go so far. Though 
they may improve the law’s approach to sex discrimination, they do 
not alter the architecture of employment discrimination law as a 
whole. 
Perhaps the time has come to adopt a new regulatory scheme for 
employment discrimination. The idea has intuitive appeal. After all, 
modern discrimination bears little resemblance to what 
discrimination looked like when Title VII became law. In her work on 
trait discrimination, Kimberly Yuracko offers Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s inability to find legal work as an attorney as a good 
example of what discrimination used to look like.314 Despite 
graduating third in her class at Stanford Law School, the only law 
firm job Justice O’Connor could get was as a legal secretary.315 
Discrimination used to be about formal segregation and exclusion. 
Today, however, it is about not fitting in at work. The Justice 
O’Connors of the world have been replaced by the likes of Darlene 
Jespersen, Peter Oiler, and Dawn Dawson, men and women whose 
identities mark them as different from their coworkers. If 
discrimination has changed so much, why has discrimination law 
changed so little? 
 
 310. Goldberg, supra note 225, at 731. 
 311. See Elizabeth M. Glazer, Repairing Antidiscrimination Law from the Inside Out 1 
(2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 312. See McCormick, supra note 224, at 500. 
 313. See generally Nancy Levit, Changing Workforce Demographics and the Future of the 
Protected Class Approach, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 463 (2012). 
 314. Yuracko, supra note 19, at 167–68. 
 315. Id. 
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Whether we should adopt a new regime and what that regime 
might look like are important questions that warrant deeper 
consideration than I can offer in this space. Though I may not have 
broken Title VII’s mold, I have offered a new way of thinking about 
sex discrimination—and possibly other forms of discrimination, too. 
My hope is that, at the very least, this Article will stimulate further 
discussion about whether and how we can make employment 
discrimination law more attuned to the needs of employees as it finds 
them today. 
CONCLUSION 
In an influential sexual harassment case, Justice Scalia once 
wrote that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil 
to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the 
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our 
legislators by which we are governed.”316 Though he was writing about 
a particular issue in sex discrimination law,317 I take Justice Scalia’s 
words to be a broader statement about the scope and ambitions of 
employment discrimination law in general. He recognized both that 
discrimination will change over time and that, for it to be effective, 
the law must change, too. In that spirit, this Article has proposed 
significant structural changes to sex discrimination law. My hope is 
that these changes will make the law more effective in its ongoing and 
ever-changing fight against sex discrimination. 
 
 
 316. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 317. See id. at 79–80 (holding that employees can raise same-sex sexual harassment claims 
under Title VII). 
